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The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the
Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation
ERIK F. GERDING*
Phlebas the Phoenician, a fortnight dead,
Forgot the cry of gulls, and the deep sea swell
And the profit and loss.
A current under sea
Picked his bones in whispers. As he rose and fell
He passed the stages of his age and youth
Entering the whirlpool.
—T.S. Eliot, The Waste Land1
I. INTRODUCTION
As U.S. investors and policymakers begin to forget the profit of the
technology stock bubble and the losses of Enron, securities regulation reenters the whirlpool. The backlash against the Sarbanes-Oxley Act2 has
begun in earnest. Three years after that Act was signed into law and four
years after the stock market bubble burst and the Enron scandal broke, calls
for relief from the new securities laws grow louder.3 President Bush has
*
Attorney in private practice, Washington, D.C. The author would like to thank Lynn Stout and
Barak Orbach for commenting on an earlier draft of this article, Markus Brunnermeier for advice on
recent developments in economic research on stock market bubbles, John Coffee and Howell Jackson
for their comments on preliminary outlines of this article, and especially Andrea and Lucas for their
patience and support. Any errors herein are my own.
1
T.S. ELIOT, THE WASTE LAND 16 (Michael North ed., W.W. Norton & Co., 2001) (1922).
2
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and
29 U.S.C.S. (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 109-89)).
3
See, e.g., Jonathan Chait, Editorial, Was Enron Just a Dream?; Cox Will Return the SEC to Its
Lax Old Ways, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 2005, at B13, available at LEXIS, News Library, LAT File (arguing that the Bush administration aims to correct the “overreach” of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act); Pamela
Gaynor, Execs Rip Sarbanes-Oxley’s Costs, Regulations, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 19, 2005,
at D10, available at LEXIS, News Library, PSTGAZ File; Carrie Johnson, Higher Audit Fees, More
Accountability; Sarbanes-Oxley, Three Years Later, WASH. POST, July 30, 2005, at D1, available at
LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File (describing criticism of “expense and possible overreach” of the
Act and lobbying by businesses to ease the burdens of the law); Stephen Labaton, A New Mood in
Congress to Forgo Corporate Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at C3, available at LEXIS, News
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appointed Congressman Christopher Cox, a long time proponent of deregulation of the securities markets, as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission.4 Cox assumes control of an organization that has
already returned to a pre-Enron agenda of liberalizing the rules of securities offerings.5 This political groundswell has been accompanied by new
scholarship that has questioned the effectiveness of recent laws.6
These critics of Sarbanes-Oxley era reforms are exactly right; the new
securities regulations will do little to prevent future epidemics of securities
fraud. But the critics are right for a reason they do not suspect. In fact,
their criticism represents part of the reason that the new laws and regulations will fail to thwart future outbreaks of fraud. The backlash against the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, regardless of the merits of arguments against specific
provisions of the law, represents the restarting of a historic cycle of the
periodic growth and decay of securities law.
This cycle of decay and re-growth is propelled by the dynamics of
stock market bubbles and the epidemics of fraud that they generate. The
volumes of legal literature on the recent wave of fraud epitomized by Enron generally treat this epidemic as a product of its time.7 But the parallels
between the recent scandals and the securities fraud committed during historic bubbles have remained curiously under-explored in the legal literature. In fact, a survey of three centuries of stock market bubbles shows that
these periods of speculative frenzy have been accompanied by outbreaks of
widespread securities fraud.8 These outbreaks occur not merely because
the irrational investors that drive a bubble present easy prey for fraud, but
more significantly because stock market bubbles cause the decay of securities law.
Library, NYT File (describing a greater willingness by Congress to challenge financial regulations and
rethink the Sarbanes-Oxley Act due to remoteness of business scandals and rising stock market); Andrew Parker, Backlash Against the Enforcer, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2005, at 7, available at LEXIS,
News Library, FINTME File (describing industry criticism of the SEC and its enforcement efforts);
Andrew Parker & Sundeep Tucker, Sarbanes-Oxley Reforms ‘Go Too Far’, Says Author, FIN. TIMES,
July 8, 2005, at 6, available at LEXIS, News Library, FINTME File (describing criticisms of act by its
Republican co-author, Michael Oxley); Leo Strine, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Creeping Intrusion, FIN. TIMES,
July 6, 2005, at 21, available at LEXIS, News Library, FINTME File (describing criticism of the corporate governance provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by the Vice-Chancellor of the Delaware Court
of Chancery).
4
Clay Risen, Stop Loss: Out with Donaldson, In with Cox, NEW REPUBLIC, June 20, 2005, at 10,
available at LEXIS, News Library, NEWRPB File.
5
Securities Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005) (to be codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.).
6
See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) (surveying accounting and economic research that indicates a lack
of an empirical basis for many Sarbanes-Oxley era reforms).
7
See infra Part V.A.
8
Historians outside legal academia have explored the history of fraud during bubbles. For one
history, see EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL SPECULATION (1999).
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This Article explains the dynamics of how bubbles lead to the decay of
securities law and argues that this decay will render not only the SarbanesOxley Act, but other securities laws, ineffective in preventing future epidemics of fraud. Bubbles trigger the decay of securities law in two ways.
First, bubbles generate or reinforce strong political pressures to deregulate
financial markets and dilute securities regulations. This pressure manifests
itself not only in efforts to roll back laws that would otherwise deter fraud,
but also in under-enforcement of existing laws and resistance to proposals
to address concerns about speculation or the growing risk of fraud. These
effects can be characterized more generally; the dynamics of a stock market bubble reduces the incentives and capacities of regulators to address
adequately the growing risk of financial fraud—including novel forms of
fraud—that accompanies the bubble.9 In many historical instances, political pressure has resulted in government promotion of speculation or even
endorsement of fraudulent ventures during a stock market bubble.10
Second, bubbles undermine the effectiveness of even those laws that
remain untouched by deregulation. Compliance with securities laws deteriorates during bubble periods because the dynamics of a bubble, particularly the mass perception that stock prices will continue to rise, erodes
much of the deterrent threat of anti-fraud rules.11 Bubbles thus skew the
calculus of compliance for securities issuers and market intermediaries.
This Article unpacks the modes in which bubbles promote the decay of
securities law. Part II provides a brief introduction to recent economic
scholarship, particularly by behavioral finance scholars, into the formation
of bubbles. According to behavioral finance theorists, stock market bubbles are driven by “noise traders” who make irrational investment decisions
on the basis of herding behavior and behavioral biases.12 These behavioral
influences combine to create both a mass perception in the market that
stock prices will continue to surge and a individual perception by investors
that they will be able to identify the right moment to sell and escape a market downturn.13
9
See infra Part III.B (discussing business-friendly regulatory reforms of the 1990s). For a description of these deregulatory pressures during the 1990s, see ROGER LOWENSTEIN, ORIGINS OF THE
CRASH 82–100 (2004). Examples of deregulation during other bubbles are provided infra Part III.A
and the Appendix.
10
See, e.g., infra notes 67–72 and accompanying text (describing Parliament’s complicity in the
1690s stock market boom); infra notes 83–89 (describing the English government’s role in the South
Sea scandal); infra notes 124–127 (describing the Coolidge administration’s laissez-faire attitude toward corporate regulation).
11
See infra Part V.C.
12
ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 135–68 (2000); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 112–74 (2000). For an early analysis
of “noise trading” in the legal literature, see Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 858–72 (1992).
13
Werner De Bondt, Bubble Psychology, in ASSET PRICE BUBBLES 205, 212 (William C. Hunter
et al. eds., 2003).
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Part III surveys six stock market bubbles between the 1690s and 1990s
that demonstrate the high correlation between the rise of a stock market
bubble and epidemics of securities fraud, the pattern of deregulation of
financial markets preceding or during the formation of a bubble followed
by a political, legal and re-regulatory response in the aftermath of a bubble’s collapse, and how political forces lay the groundwork for future deregulation once memories of the fraud recede. Although other scholars
have chronicled how historical bubbles have generated new securities
laws,14 the pattern of deregulation during a bubble’s rise has not been thoroughly explored in the legal literature.
Part IV then offers a model that explains this trend of deregulation during the inflation of a bubble followed by re-regulation after the collapse of
a bubble as a product of the interaction of the stock market and the political
market for regulations. Part IV thus responds to a need for a model of the
interaction of the economics and politics of a bubble suggested by a prominent behavioral finance economist.15 During the formation of a bubble,
three inter-related cycles—the business cycle, the cycle of investor confidence, and the political/regulatory cycle—generate feedback for one another. These cycles generate, respectively, economic growth, investor trust
in the integrity of the market and deregulation, each to excess.16 When a
bubble bursts, these three cycles reverse and generate negative feedback
through an economic downturn, a collapse of investor confidence and trust
and re-regulation.17 The interaction of these three cycles creates a perverse
pattern of deregulation or under-regulation as bubbles form—the moment
when more regulatory oversight and anti-fraud protections are needed—
and re-regulation only after fraud has already occurred and the economy
and investor trust have been damaged.18
Part V then analyzes how even those securities laws that are not affected by deregulation lose much of their effectiveness during a bubble, as
compliance with these laws by securities issuers and market intermediaries
deteriorates. Bubbles, and particularly the mass perception that stock
prices will rise unabated, dilute the deterrence effect of anti-fraud rules by
distorting the rational calculus of compliance of securities issuers and mar14
E.g., Frank Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U. PITT. L. REV.
741, 743 & n.11 (2000). See generally Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300
Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 850 (1997); Joseph A. Grundfest, Commentary, Punctuated
Equilibria in the Evolution of United States Securities Regulation, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2002)
(describing how capital market events stimulate regulation “between relatively tranquil periods of
common law interpretation”); Larry E. Ribstein, Commentary, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 77–
78 (2003) (describing a historic cycle of stock market bubbles inflating then bursting, followed by
increased regulation).
15
SHLEIFER, supra note 12, at 174.
16
See infra Parts IV.A–B.
17
See infra Part IV.C.
18
See infra Part IV.D.
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ket intermediaries.19 Furthermore, bubbles skew the extra-rational calculus
of these actors by exacerbating behavioral biases; these biases further undermine deterrence of malfeasance and warp perceptions of materiality, a
keystone of securities law.20 Finally, even companies that seek to obey the
law find compliance difficult because bubbles raise information and
agency costs.21
Part VI discusses the implications of the decay of securities law during
bubble periods described in Parts IV and V. Deregulation and the deterioration of securities law deterrence mean that many of the post-Enron laws
and regulations are likely to have little effect on securities fraud during the
next stock market bubble. These laws and regulations are likely to be
rolled back, under-enforced or undermined by the dynamics of the next
bubble. Part VI sets forth a research agenda for further understanding
these decaying effects and designing a more robust securities law regime
that would better withstand this periodic decay.
II. BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE ANATOMY OF A BUBBLE
Economists define a stock market bubble—one example of a broad set
of phenomena known as “asset price bubbles”—as a pronounced and prolonged deviation in the prices of securities from their fundamental values.22
The fundamental value of a security, according to most definitions in the
economic literature, represents the present value of all future cash flows
(i.e., dividends) from that security.23 But certain theoretical24 and practical25 problems with this definition make a refined formulation more attractive. Other economists have defined fundamental value as the price a ra19

See infra Part V.C.1.
See infra Part V.C.2.
See infra Part V.C.3.
22
SHLEIFER, supra note 12, at 154; Robert P. Flood & Peter M. Garber, Market Fundamentals
Versus Price-Level Bubbles: The First Tests, 88 J. POL. ECON. 745, 746 (1980); Henry T. C. Hu, Faith
and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78 TEX. L. REV. 777, 794 (2000).
For more detailed surveys of recent economic scholarship, particularly behavioral finance scholarship, regarding stock market bubbles see for example ASSET PRICE BUBBLES, supra note 13; MARKUS K. BRUNNERMEIER, ASSET PRICING UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 47–59 (2001); SHILLER,
supra note 12.
23
See, e.g., Ellen R. McGrattan & Edward C. Prescott, Testing for Stock Market Overvaluation/Undervaluation, in ASSET PRICE BUBBLES, supra note 13, at 271.
24
This definition requires not only a calculation of future cash flows, but also a determination of
the correct discount rate. The presence of two variables in this equation raises the “joint hypothesis
problem” that has also plagued efforts to prove (or disprove) the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. See
Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in 1B HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1054, 1061 (George M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2003).
25
The modern practice of some technology companies of not paying dividends frustrates this fundamental analysis. Without dividends, the only potential future cash flow for an equity security is its
value upon resale. These no-dividend policies make the fundamental value of these stocks highly
speculative in both senses of the word.
20
21
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tional investor would pay for a security if she held it to “horizon.”26 Under
this definition, a bubble forms when stock prices rise for a prolonged period above what investors would be willing to pay if they were to hold their
securities for the long term.27
This occurs, according to behavioral finance theory, because of the irrational investment behavior of unsophisticated investors called “noise
traders.”28 These noise traders do not base their investment decisions on a
rational calculus of the fundamentals of a stock, but instead engage in
“herding” (i.e., mimicking the investment decisions of others) and adopt
“positive feedback investment strategies” (i.e., chasing trends and buying
securities once prices have risen and selling after prices have started falling).29 Noise traders engage in these less than rational investment strategies because they suffer from behavioral biases,30 including the following:
•
•
•
26

Overoptimism describes how, during bubbles, noise traders possess
an overly optimistic view of their own prospects in a stock market;31
Overconfidence describes how noise traders overestimate their
own ability to predict stock market fluctuations and time their exit
before a crash;32 and
The availability bias describes how more recent or salient events
See, e.g., Franklin Allen & Gary Gorton, Churning Bubbles, 60 REV. ECON. STUD. 813, 815

(1993).
27

See id.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
See SHILLER, supra note 12, at 135–68 (outlining the psychological basis for investment decisions and effect of herd behavior on capital markets); Robert J. Shiller, Stock Prices and Social Dynamics, 1984 BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY 457, 457 [hereinafter Shiller, Stock Prices] (arguing
that investors make decisions because of social and behavioral factors rather than through rational, selfinterested calculations). For a discussion of the psychology behind noise trader activity, see generally
Robert J. Shiller, Fashions, Fads, and Bubbles in Financial Markets, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS 56–68 (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter Shiller, Fashions].
30
For a sample of the now extensive literature on behavioral economics and its implications for
law and economics, see for example Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Performance: Of Risk,
Duress and Cognition, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 71, 140–70 (1998); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). For a discussion of behavioral biases
leading to the formation of stock market bubbles, see De Bondt, supra note 13, at 210–12.
31
See, e.g., J. Bradford De Long & Andrei Shleifer, The Stock Market Bubble of 1929: Evidence
from Closed-end Mutual Funds, 51 J. ECON. HIST. 675, 697 (1991) (concluding that over-optimism of
investors contributed to the 1929 stock market bubble).
32
See J. Bradford De Long et al., The Survival of Noise Traders in Financial Markets, 64 J.
BUS. 1, 5 (1991) (arguing that the overconfidence bias leads noise traders to remain in the market
despite a risk of severe losses). Behavioral economists have presented substantial empirical evidence that individuals exhibit overoptimism in judging the probability of good outcomes and are
overconfident in their own abilities, including their ability to estimate probabilities. See Barberis &
Thaler, supra note 24, at 1065–66 (citing Marc Alpert & Howard Raiffa, A Progress Report on the
Training of Probability Accessors, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 294 (Daniel Kahneman et
al. eds., 1982)); Baruch Fischhoff et al., Knowing with Certainty: The Appropriateness of Extreme
Confidence, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 552 (1977); Neil
D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980).
28
29
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tend to overly influence an individual’s estimates of probabilities.33
Thus a long market boom and the conspicuous gains of other investors cause noise traders to overestimate their own investment
prospects. Conversely, the remoteness of the last crash or market
downturn causes investors to discount the possibility of incurring
heavy losses.34
Other biases, such as framing,35 belief perseverance,36 and anchoring,37
further contribute to the suggestibility of investors and their stubborn reluctance to abandon optimism over their own prospects in the stock market
despite mounting evidence to the contrary.38
The theory that these behavioral biases can lead to bubbles flies
against the logic of neoclassical economics, which holds that capital markets efficiently value securities.39 In particular, neoclassical economic
33
See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCIENCE 1124, 1127–28 (1974).
34
Richard J. Herring & Susan Wachter, Real Estate Booms and Banking Busts: An International
Perspective (The Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working Paper 99-27, 1999) (on file with author); see also J.
Bradford De Long et al., Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation, 45 J. FIN. 379, 383 (1990) (questioning why noise traders do not learn from previous bubbles).
35
Empirical research demonstrates that individuals often reach different conclusions about the
same problems depending on how problems are described or framed. Faced with difficult problems,
individuals frame problems for themselves often in less than rational ways and engage in what has
been labeled “mental accounting.” See generally Richard S. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, in
CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES 241 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
36
Belief perseverance describes the tendency of individuals to maintain longstanding opinions
even in the face of mounting contradictory evidence. Barberis & Thaler, supra note 24, at 1068
(citing Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior
Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2099
(1979)).
37
Anchoring describes the tendency of individuals to give undue weight to their initial estimates
of a probability or other measurement. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 33, at 1128.
38
See De Bondt, supra note 13, at 208–09.
39
This neoclassical logic is distilled in the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. A discussion of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis is beyond the scope of this article. For two of the many prominent contributions to the debate in the legal scholarship on the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, see generally Ronald
J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984)
(explaining how capital and information markets work together in creating efficient securities prices);
Langevoort, supra note 12 (discussing the widening gulf between the conceptions of market efficiency
in the legal and economic literature).
Legal scholars have correctly noted that, in its strict sense, the Efficient Market Hypothesis only
contends that market prices reflect all available information regarding a security and not that prices
necessarily reflect that security’s fundamental value. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 766–71
(1985) (drawing distinction between arguments that markets are characterized by speculative (i.e.
informational) efficiency versus those discussing allocational efficiency); Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87
MICH. L. REV. 613, 615–18 (1988) (defining the Efficient Market Hypothesis and testing the assumption that stock market prices direct the distribution of capital and other resources); William K.S. Wang,
Some Arguments that the Stock Market is not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341, 344 (1986) (discussing “information-arbitrage” efficiency where prices reflect all public information). Despite this
distinction, the economic literature on bubbles often appears to conflate informational and allocational
efficiency. See, e.g., Barberis & Thaler, supra note 24, at 1056 (defining “fundamental value” as “the
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theory holds that (1) investors invest and trade in the capital markets in a
rational manner, (2) any irrational trades are random and cancel each
other out, and (3) arbitrage corrects any remaining irrational trading not
cancelled out.40
Behavioral finance counters each of these assumptions in turn. First,
as noted above, behavioral finance draws upon extensive research in behavioral psychology and economics to demonstrate that investors do not
act with perfect rationality. Moreover, behavioral finance has documented
both statistical evidence of mispricings in securities41 and examples of
various pricing anomalies in capital markets42 that demonstrate the depth
and persistence of noise trading. Experimental economists have buttressed
these findings through studies that demonstrate how even relatively financially sophisticated investors can behave like noise traders in simulated
stock markets; even in experiments where all future cash payments of secudiscounted sum of expected future cash flows” where investors are operating with all available information).
Some economists have attempted to develop models of bubbles—called “rational bubbles”—that
are consistent with assumptions of rational investors and rational markets, yet produce deviations from
fundamental values. But rational bubble models have failed to gain acceptance in the economic literature due to theoretical incompleteness (including a failure to specify how the initial deviations from
fundamental value occur), lack of empirical support and mathematical indeterminacy. See generally
M.C. Adam & A. Szafarz, Speculative Bubbles and Financial Markets, 44 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 626
(1992) (analyzing rational bubbles and finding severe limitations); Allan H. Meltzer, Rational and
Nonrational Bubbles, in ASSET PRICE BUBBLES, supra note 13, at 23, 24 (calling the rational bubble
hypothesis “devoid of empirical content”).
40
Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman provide an excellent formulation of these three arguments
that undergird the Efficient Market Hypothesis in an influential article, now almost two decades old.
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 39, at 579–88.
41
See SHILLER, supra note 12, at 179–80.
42
These anomalies include the following:
• The closed end fund puzzle. The prices of certain mutual funds have occasionally risen far
above the net asset value of the fund, even after adjusting for tax and other considerations.
This means that investors are paying more for shares in a fund than they would pay for the
proportionate share of the stocks in that fund’s portfolio. See De Long & Shleifer, supra note
31, at 697 (recognizing this phenomenon in the late 1920s).
• The twin-share anomaly. This anomaly occurs when a given security is traded on two different markets, but the prices in those markets diverge over an extended period of time. See Barberis & Thaler, supra note 24, at 1061–63 (explaining the twin-share anomaly and noting how
arbitrageurs could exploit it).
• The IPO carve out anomaly. After 3Com sold five percent of its shares of Palm in an initial
public offering, Palm’s stock price paradoxically rose above the implicit price of its parent,
3Com. John H. Cochrane, Stocks as Money: Convenience Yield and the Tech-Stock Bubble, in
ASSET PRICE BUBBLES, supra note 13, at 175–76; Owen A. Lamont & Richard H. Thaler, Can
the Market Add and Subtract? Mispricing in Tech Stock Carve-Outs, 111 J. POL. ECON. 227,
230–31 (2003).
• Internet name anomalies. During the recent technology stock boom, researchers noted that
shares of companies with “.com” in their name sold in public offerings for significantly higher
prices statistically than those of comparable companies. Also, market news about certain
companies would irrationally affect the prices of different companies with similar names of
stock market ticker symbols. Yaron Brook & Robert J. Hendershott, Hype and Internet
Stocks, 10 J. INVESTING 53 (2001), available at InfoTrac OneFile; Michael J. Cooper et al., A
Rose.com by Any Other Name, 56 J. FIN. 2371, 2371–72 (2001).
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rities and a discount value were given to all participants, investors with a
business or financial background still engage in bidding wars that drive
prices higher than fundamental values and create a bubble.43
Second, behavioral finance presents evidence that these biases lead investors to exhibit herd behavior, follow fads, chase trends and engage in
positive feedback investment strategies.44 Thus the trades of irrational investors, instead of canceling each other out, reinforce each other; this trend
refutes the second contention of neoclassical scholars.45
Finally, arbitrageurs face severe limitations and risks in attempting to
exploit the mispricing caused by noise traders.46 In fact, arbitrageurs with
43
Ronald R. King et al., The Robustness of Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Stock Markets,
in NONLINEAR DYNAMICS AND EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS 183, 196–98 (Richard H. Day & Ping
Chen eds., 1993); Gunduz Caginalp et al., Overreactions, Momentum, Liquidity, and Price Bubbles in
Laboratory and Field Asset Markets, 1 J. PSYCHOL. & FIN. MKTS. 24, 28 (2000); David P. Porter &
Vernon L. Smith, Futures Contracts and Dividend Uncertainty in Experimental Asset Markets, 68 J.
BUS. 509, 513, 524–25 (1995). But these experiments did demonstrate that, when traders develop
“experience” within these experimental markets (by having participated in the experiments several
times), the occurrence of bubbles is reduced. See King et al., supra, at 199; Caginalp et al., supra, at
26; Porter & Smith, supra, at 524.
44
See SHLEIFER, supra note 12, at 11–12.
45
Id. at 12.
46
See Barberis & Thaler, supra note 24, at 1058–59. First, arbitrageurs face fundamental risk; future news about a company may drive the prices against the arbitrageur’s position. Id. at 1058. Hedging by buying or selling substitute stocks cannot completely remove this risk given the rarity of perfect
substitutes. Id.; SHLEIFER, supra note 12, at 14. In addition, substitute stocks may themselves be
mispriced, which is more likely in periods of systematic, market-wide mispricing, such as bubbles. No
substitutes exist for stocks or bonds as a whole, making arbitrage against market-wide mispricing
impossible. SHLEIFER, supra note 12, at 13. Andrei Shleifer describes the huge losses that would have
threatened an arbitrageur attempting to sell short during the apparent stock market-wide overvaluation
during the late 1990s. Id. at 15–16.
Second, arbitrageurs face noise trader risk, which is the risk that noise traders will drive the
prices further away from fundamental values. J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in
Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703, 705 (1990). This risk becomes pronounced should a
bubble period of prolonged investor irrationality begin. See SHLEIFER, supra note 12, at 15–16
(describing noise trader risk faced by arbitrageurs attacking apparent overvaluation during the technology bubble); Markus K. Brunnermeier & Stefan Nagel, Hedge Funds and the Technology Bubble, 59 J. FIN. 2013, 2030–32 (2004) (providing an example of a hedge fund that was forced to
liquidate after refusing to invest in technology stocks during the recent bubble). Moreover, arbitrageurs who aim to exploit (and thus correct) mispricings enjoy neither unlimited resources nor infinite time horizons. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 38–
43 (1997). Noise trading could be countered by the combined resources of several arbitrageurs, but
arbitrageurs faces a risk of collective action failure, namely that other noise traders will not similarly
trade against noise because of different information. See Dilip Abreu & Markus K. Brunnermeier,
Synchronization Risk and Delayed Arbitrage, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 341–42 (2002) (labeling this risk of
collective action failure as “synchronization risk”); see also Dilip Abreu & Markus K. Brunnermeier, Crashes and Bubbles, 71 ECONOMETRICA 173 (2003). Coordinated action is limited by the
threat of defection and legal constraints.
Most arbitrageurs also have short horizons because they are managing the money of other investors; this creates a classic agency problem. Shleifer & Vishny, supra, at 37. If the arbitrageur
loses considerable money in the short run trading against noise, investors and creditors may view
this as a sign of the arbitrageur’s incompetence and threaten to withdraw funds or loans, respectively, forcing the arbitrageur to liquidate positions prematurely. Id. Arbitrageurs may be unable to
outlast noise traders; economists have shown that, contrary to the assumptions of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, noise traders can persist in financial markets for extended periods. SHLEIFER, supra
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superior information have a strong incentive to trade ahead of instead of
against noise traders.47 Arbitrageurs who adopt this strategy can reap
enormous profits and then liquidate their positions before noise traders
reverse course. Strong empirical evidence indicates that arbitrageurs in
fact behave in this manner, exacerbating the severity of mispricing caused
by noise trading.48
Andrei Shleifer, one of the leading behavioral finance economists, connects all of these elements of behavioral finance in a simple model of how
bubbles form. Shleifer’s model builds on the earlier, less mathematical and
less empirical work of Charles Kindleberger.49 First, a “displacement”—
either an external macroeconomic or political event or good news about a
specific industry—occurs that causes corporate profits to rise.50 Investors
with superior information make conspicuous gains as share prices in the
market also rise.51 Noise traders, attracted by rising share prices, enter the
market and begin bidding prices even higher.52 These noise trades adopt a
positive feedback investment strategy (a euphemism for the ‘greater fool’
theory of investing).53 Informed investors and arbitrageurs—known as
“smart money”—anticipate noise trader demand and bid up prices in advance of noise traders, stimulating demand.54 When smart money senses the
market overheating, it begins to sell off.55 Ultimately, noise traders follow
and, once a tipping point is reached, stock prices crash.56
note 12, at 44–46. See generally, J. Bradford De Long et al., The Survival of Noise Traders in Financial Markets, 64 J. BUS. 1 (1991). (Furthermore, even if a market crash wipes out noise traders,
a new generation of noise traders could enter the market in time for a new bubble. This real possibility counters the argument of some proponents of the Efficient Market Hypothesis that the bursting
of one bubble precludes future episodes of irrationality. See Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of
Market Inefficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 666 (2003). The risks arbitrageurs face in betting against
irrational investors are not just theoretical. The Tiger Fund, perhaps the most prominent fund that
refused to invest in technology stocks in the late 1990s and bet against these stocks, suffered heavy
losses and was forced to close in March 2000, mere months before the peak of the NASDAQ.
Brunnermeier & Nagel, supra, at 2032.
47
SHLEIFER, supra note 12, at 169, 172 (describing how arbitrageurs trade ahead and facilitate
noise traders).
48
See Brunnermeier & Nagel, supra note 46, at 2014–16.
49
See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES 15–16 (4th ed. 2000) (defining a bubble as “an upward price movement over an extended range that then implodes”). For a summary of Kindleberger’s theory, see Partnoy, supra note 14, at 755–57.
50
SHLEIFER, supra note 12, at 169.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 154–55.
53
Id.; see BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 32, 43 (1999), available at NetLibrary (discussing the “greater fool” theory of investing); see also supra note 29 and accompanying text. For a discussion of how the strategy of investing based on the belief that stocks can
always be sold to a “greater fool” can lead to stock market bubbles, see JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE
WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM
SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES AND NATIONS 249–51 (2004).
54
SHLEIFER, supra note 12, at 172.
55
See infra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing the “pump and dump” scam).
56
SHLEIFER, supra note 12, at 173.
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III. A BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY OF BUBBLES:
DEREGULATION, SECURITIES FRAUD, AND RE-REGULATION
Kindleberger, Shleifer and other economists have traced this economic model through numerous prominent financial crises widely considered to have been stock market or other asset price bubbles.57 But in
their historical analysis, economists have generally not focused on two
phenomena that suggest deep connections between bubbles and law and
lawbreaking. These two phenomena—the high correlation between bubbles and episodes of widespread financial fraud, and the pattern of deregulation as a bubble inflates, followed by a sharp regulatory and political response as that bubble bursts, followed by deregulation again—
demonstrate that bubbles must be understood not only in strict economic
terms, but also in the legal, political and regulatory environment in which
bubbles inflate and burst.
This Part surveys six historical bubbles. Part III.A discusses five bubbles from the 1690s in England to the 1960s in the United States.58 Part
III.B focuses on the deregulation preceding and the re-regulation following
the bubble in U.S. technology stocks in the late 1990s. (The Appendix
provides a chart surveying these six bubbles and four others.) For each of
the six bubbles discussed in this Part (and in the bubbles analyzed in the
chart in the Appendix), this historical survey focuses on two phenomena—
the occurrence of widespread fraud during the rise of a stock market bubble, and the regulatory political cycle that leads up to and follows the bursting of the bubble.
First, an analysis of each historical episode reveals that the inflation of
stock market bubbles have been accompanied by epidemics of widespread
securities fraud. These epidemics break out during a bubble’s rise, but are
usually discovered only once a bubble has collapsed. The recent wave of
fraud epitomized by Enron has many historical precursors. In fact, the
history of bubbles from the 1690s to the 1960s coincides with the history
of massive securities and financial fraud. This close correlation started
with the dawn of capital markets; the first cases of securities fraud in the
Anglo-American world appeared in the midst of the first two bubbles in the
then emerging institution of the stock market—the English stock market
boom of the 1690s and the South Sea Bubble of 1719–1720.59
57
See KINDLEBERGER, supra note 49, at 223–32 (listing famous price bubbles); SHLEIFER, supra
note 12, at 169–73 (similar).
58
For a historical account of speculation and fraud in the early years of the Dutch stock market,
see JOSEPH DE LA VEGA, CONFUSIÓN DE CONFUSIONES (Hermann Kellenbenz trans., 1957) (1688).
Speculation in the Dutch stock market also spilled over into the earliest known bubble, the Dutch
tulipomania of the 1630s. See CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 14–20. Because this bubble involved
flower bulbs not stocks, this Article does not address the tulipomania at length.
59
For a more in-depth history of speculative bubbles and the fraud that accompanies them, see
generally CHANCELLOR, supra note 8. For a discussion of how U.S. courts have responded to bubbles,
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The parallels between fraud during past bubbles and the securities
fraud of the past decade suggest that if the phenomena of widespread fraud
is not unique to the 1990s, then perhaps the causes of the epidemic do not
stem purely from circumstances unique to that decade. Broader, cyclical
economic forces—in other words, the dynamics of a bubble—may be
largely to blame.
One aspect of these dynamics is examined in the second part of the
analysis of each bubble. The survey below reveals a distinct pattern of
deregulation preceding or during the formation of a bubble, followed by a
sharp regulatory reaction once a bubble bursts. This Article uses “deregulation” as shorthand for several legal or political actions that either loosen
legal constraints on market participants or, in some cases, actually directly
enlist the government in the promotion of the speculative frenzy that drives
the bubble.60 Each bubble analyzed either follows or coincides with some
combination of: (1) a period of active deregulation, (2) lax enforcement of
existing financial and securities regulations, (3) reluctance—or even active
political resistance to—proposals to tighten regulation of capital markets in
order to dampen speculation or combat suspected fraud, or even (4) active
and direct government promotion of the speculative ventures that create a
bubble.
After the burst of each bubble, a sharp political reaction occurs, usually
bringing sweeping regulations back to the capital markets.61 But, over
time, memories of the crash and bubble fade, political support for regulation wanes and deregulation again gains traction. The length of time that
elapses between the re-regulation that follows the bubble and the onset of
deregulation varies according to the economic severity of the bubble’s collapse.
Part IV provides a model that explains these historical patterns of deregulation and re-regulation with a political and economic analysis of the
interactions between bubbles, politics and law.
financial panics and crises in shaping the common law, see generally Daniel W. Levy, A Legal History
of Irrational Exuberance, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 799 (1998). For a cultural history of speculative
crises and financial frauds in the United States, see generally STEVE FRASER, EVERY MAN A SPECULATOR: A HISTORY OF WALL STREET IN AMERICAN LIFE (2005).
60
This broader definition of deregulation (and regulation) is more useful in a historical analysis of
financial markets given that the modern financial regulatory state dates back less than a century. But
before this time, sovereigns and governments did use laws and political actions to influence financial
markets, albeit through a different array of tools than those used in modern times. See, e.g., infra text
accompanying notes 67–72 (describing the English government’s role in creating the stock market
bubble of the 1690s). Thus, a historical analysis of the regulation of financial markets before the 20th
century must seek to uncover these modes of influence and, where appropriate, analogize to modern
regulations.
61
This article draws on, among other sources, a skeletal outline of political reactions to the collapse of asset price bubbles. E.g., SHLEIFER, supra note 12, at 170–71. This Part analyzes additional
bubbles, provides more historical details on the political reactions in the wake of collapsed bubbles, and
adds an analysis of the political and legal reactions to the rise of a bubble.
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A. Survey of Bubbles from the 1690s to the 1960s
1. The 1690s English Stock Market Boom
The 1690s witnessed both the development of one of the first regular
markets for trading shares in joint stock companies and then one of history’s first speculative bubbles, which developed in that new market.62 An
unsophisticated, newly minted investor class became easy prey for financial deceit and thus ensured that the first stock markets, particularly the
nascent English stock market of the 1690s, would serve as the first venues
for widespread securities fraud. Fraud in the 1690s English stock market
took many forms, including the creation of “sham companies . . . launched
for the enrichment of projectors,” the manipulation of share prices, and the
circulation of false rumors about company prospects.63 The 1690s bubble
sired perhaps the first incarnations of both price manipulation by groups of
stock brokers,64 including what is now known as the “pump and dump”
scam, which describes when a group of stockholders publicly tout the baseless prospects of a company and then secretly sell their shares as the stock
rises.65 A new class of market professionals, known as “stock-jobbers,”
who would later be known as brokers, invented other market manipulating
schemes that would be repeated in bubbles of later centuries, including
efforts to “corner” markets of particular stocks.66
The English government was deeply—albeit indirectly—involved in
the creation of the stock market and in the promotion of the speculative
frenzy of the bubble. The stock market first took flight when the government created the Bank of England to borrow money from the public in
small denomination loans that could be traded in a secondary market.67
But the government did more than spur the creation of the capital market;
many of the speculative and fraudulent ventures of the decade operated
62

See CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 31–32, 47–48, 52.
Id. at 48; see also STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION 30–31
(1998). Daniel Defoe, author of Robinson Crusoe, fell victim to one such scam and thereafter authored
numerous pamphlets denouncing stock speculators and calling for government regulation of the market.
See BANNER, supra, at 29–30, 32–36 (citing DANIEL DEFOE, ESSAYS UPON SEVERAL SUBJECTS (London, London & Westminster, 1702); DANIEL DEFOE, THE VILLAINY OF STOCK-JOBBERS DETECTED
(London, 1701); DANIEL DEFOE, THE ANATOMY OF EXCHANGE-ALLEY: OR, A SYSTEM OF STOCKJOBBING (London, 1719)).
64
See BANNER, supra note 63, at 30–31; CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 52.
65
See CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 48 (discussing the practice of “stockjobbing”); SEC, Pump
and Dump Schemes, http://www.sec.gov/answers/pumpdump.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2005). Early
entrepreneurs of fraud took full advantage of the new technologies of the printing press and the media;
economist Robert Shiller theorizes that the history of bubbles begins with the history of newspapers, as
newspapers (and later television) facilitated the spread of investor beliefs about the market, especially
manias and rumors. See SHILLER, supra note 12, at 71, 73 & 267 n.1.
66
See BANNER, supra note 63, at 25–27, 30–31.
67
See id. at 23.
63
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under royal charters or government patents.68 At the same time, the government was reluctant to regulate the market despite growing public outcry
over speculation, fraud and market manipulation.69 Government objections
to the speculative frenzy and fraudulent schemes were further muted as
many company promoters distributed company shares to government figures to buy their support.70 Parliament considered bills to regulate the
markets in 1694 and the spring of 1696, but this legislative response
stalled.71 The bubble burst in the summer of 1696 when stock prices
plummeted, investors lost fortunes and financial crisis took hold.72
The bursting of the bubble led to both virulent public outcry against
stock speculators and brokers and England’s first securities laws.73 In
1697, Parliament reacted to the manipulation of stock prices during the
bubble by cadres of brokers by passing an act that limited the number of
brokers in London to 100, all of whom were to be licensed by the Aldermen of the City of London.74 This legislation required that brokers pay an
annual fee for their license and prohibited them from dealing for their own
account or from charging commissions above a statutory limit.75
After this initial, sharp legal response, the regulatory impulse subsided
with the passage of time. In 1708, the 1697 act expired.76 In 1711, Parliament considered, but failed to pass a bill to revive that act.77 After 1711,
68

The boom began with the spectacular success of royally chartered trading companies and was
further fueled by the spectacular success of diving companies that received public “patents” to recover
shipwrecks or that obtained technological patents for diving equipment. CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at
34–36. Other companies soon floated shares touting patents for a wide array of other inventions. See
id. at 37–39. See generally Christine Macleod, The 1690s Patent Boom: Invention or Stock-Jobbing?,
39 ECON. HIST. REV. 549 (1986) (summarizing patents enrolled during the time period 1691–1693).
69
See BANNER, supra note 63, at 39 (describing how the “government’s growing dependence on
the credit market posed an obstacle to regulation”).
70
See CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 48–49.
71
See BANNER, supra note 63, at 39.
72
See CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 51–52.
73
See id.
74
An Act to Restrain the Number and Ill Practice of Brokers and Stock Jobbers, 1697, 8 & 9 Will.
3, c. 32; accord BANNER, supra note 63, at 39; CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 52. The lord mayor used
his new licensing powers to institute quotas that capped the number of Jewish brokers and the number
of foreign brokers to twelve each. BANNER, supra note 63, at 39.
75
BANNER, supra note 63, at 39–40; CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 52–53. The Act also imposed tight restrictions on futures transactions by mandating that no more than three days elapse between contract formation and transfer of the securities. However, courts narrowly interpreted this
restriction. BANNER, supra note 63, at 40. The strong political reaction against the bubble culminated
in a 1695 parliamentary investigation into official corruption, leading to “the expulsion of the Speaker
of the Commons, the impeachment of the Lord President of the Council, and the imprisonment of the
Governor of the East India Company.” CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 49.
76
BANNER, supra note 63, at 39–40. Stuart Banner writes that when the act expired, Parliament
did authorize the city of London to license brokers and impose a fee, but that this new legislation was a
shadow of its predecessor. “[T]he new statute placed no limit on the number of brokers, and appears to
have been intended primarily as a means of raising revenue for the city rather than curbing securities
trading.” Id. at 40.
77
BANNER, supra note 63, at 40. The only aspect of the 1697 act that was revived in 1711, was
the reestablishment of limits on broker commissions. See id. at 40 (citing 1711, 10 Ann. c. 19, § 121).
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no new major securities laws were passed until Parliament was forced to
respond to the next bubble in 1720.78
2. The South Sea Bubble
Two decades after England’s first bubble, memories had faded enough
to permit an even larger speculative stock market frenzy. The South Sea
Bubble drew inspiration from a contemporaneous scheme and bubble in
France, where organizers of a venture called the Mississippi Company
convinced the French state to allow them to acquire, privatize and securitize the French national debt and all revenues from trade with the Louisiana
territory.79 The early wild success of these Frenchmen spurred a copycat
scheme to privatize the English debt through an entity known as the South
Sea Company. This complex scheme resulted in sales of South Sea shares
for many times the value of the only assets of the Company, the right to
receive debt payments from the English crown.80 In a development that
foreshadowed the role of stock options in the bubble and scandals of the
late 1990s, South Sea insiders held secret shareholdings and stock options.81 Just as in the 1690s, dramatic rises in stock prices and fantastic
early capital gains spawned both wild speculation and imitators. Fraudulent schemes proliferated; promoters again sold stock in companies with
nonexistent assets and fictitious prospects.82
Promoters of this English scheme copied not only the French strategy
of securitizing national debt, but the tactics of thoroughly co-opting the
government as well.83 This British scheme was conducted through the
South Sea Company, a stock corporation created by an Act of Parliament.84
A second act, encouraged by gifts of shares to members of Parliament,
78

BANNER, supra note 63, at 40.
For a discussion of the Mississippi Bubble, see infra note 298 and accompanying text.
CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 62. For the history of the South Sea Bubble, see JOHN
CARSWELL, THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE (1960); see also CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 58–95. For a
more dated account of the bubble, see CHARLES MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS
AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS 49–91 (Crown Trade Paperbacks, 1980) (1841).
For one economic analysis of the South Sea financial structure and the resultant bubbles, see
Larry D. Neal, How the South Sea Bubble was Blown Up and Burst: A New Look at Old Data, in
CRASHES AND PANICS 33 (Eugene N. White ed., 1990). For an account by an economist who argues
that the South Sea episode does not meet the economist definition of a bubble because stock prices in
the period could be explained by fundamental values, see PETER M. GARBER, FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES
91–93, 105–07 (2000).
For an in-depth analysis of the legal response to this bubble, see BANNER, supra note 63, at 41,
75–87.
81
E.g., CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 75 (describing the activities of company co-founder John
Blunt).
82
See MALCOLM BALEN, THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE 89–90, 97 (2003);
CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 70–71.
83
For an account of the political maneuverings of the South Sea promoters to curry favor with the
king and the governing party, see BALEN, supra note 82, at 41–44, 72, 76–77.
84
CARSWELL, supra note 80, at 54.
79
80
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approved the terms of the scheme: the company assumed the national debt
and then issued additional stock into the market.85 The government opposed measures introduced in Parliament to regulate the terms of converting the debt, as prominent ministers and courtiers secretly held company
stock granted to them by company insiders.86 (The King and the Bank of
England were also prominent, albeit publicly-known, shareholders.)87 The
South Sea Company engaged in systematic bribery through overt distributions of stock and covert, illegal share options granted to courtiers, ministers and members of Parliament.88 Aside from bribery, the government had
other reasons to back the scheme, particularly a desire to reduce the national debt.89
The early success of the South Sea subscription led to an explosion of
private speculative companies floating shares, many of them fraudulent.90
The South Sea promoters responded to competition from the proliferation
of other stock company schemes by persuading the government to pass the
Bubble Act,91 which prohibited the formation of new companies without
authorization by an act of Parliament and prevented existing companies
from engaging in activities not specified in their charter.92 The South Sea
directors also requested that the Attorney General issue writs of prosecution, called Scire Facias, against three companies for engaging in activities
not authorized by their respective charters.93
The collapse of the South Sea bubble led to a passionate political reaction, including the formation of an extraordinary secret committee of Par85

See BANNER, supra note 63, at 43.
See CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 64–65.
87
See BALEN, supra note 82, at 40; CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 68.
88
CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 91; see also BALEN, supra note 82, at 76, 81–82, 89, 169, 205.
89
See BALEN, supra note 82, at 69–76.
90
See id. at 90, 96–97; CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 70–71.
91
The official name of the Bubble Act was “An Act to Restrain the Extravagant and Unwarrantable Practice of Raising Money by Voluntary Subscription for Carrying on Projects Dangerous to the
Trade and Subjects of the United Kingdom,” 1720, 6 Geo. c. 18.
92
CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 82. One popular misconception is that the Bubble Act was
passed in reaction to the collapse of the South Sea Bubble, when in fact it was passed before the collapse at the urging of directors of the South Sea Company. CARSWELL, supra note 80, at 139. These
directors sought to protect their stock offerings from competition in the capital markets from other
speculative ventures. CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 82.
It was only later that commentators erroneously recast the Bubble Act as a response to the collapse of the bubble. BANNER, supra note 63, at 75 n.129. Nevertheless, this misconception contains a
kernel of insight, as the century-long duration of the Bubble Act stems from the lasting public memory
of both the fraud during the bubble and the severe economic fallout from the bubble’s ultimate collapse. See id. at 75–79; CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 88–90. The Bubble Act therefore represents
both an example of government intervention to support a bubble and a government response to the
perceived evils of the bubble after the crash.
93
CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 82. Ultimately, this tactic backfired, as these writs caused the
price of these three companies to plummet, which, in turn, instigated a general market panic that
quickly engulfed the South Sea Company. Id. at 83. South Sea share prices nose-dived and the complex Ponzi scheme created by the Company directors unraveled. See id. at 83–84.
86
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liament to investigate the South Sea Company’s directors, which uncovered widespread corruption.94 The findings of the committee provoked
street protests and unprecedented trials in the House of Commons, sanctions, and even imprisonment in the Tower of London for some of the
Company’s promoters and corrupted members of Parliament.95 Parliament
ultimately passed ex post facto laws to seize the profits of directors of the
South Sea Company,96 and the Sir John Barnard’s Act, which prohibited
short sales and trading in futures and options.97 The South Sea bubble had
such a profound effect on the English political and legal landscape that the
Sir John Barnard’s Act and the Bubble Act—which together stifled the
formation of companies and financial innovation—remained in effect for
over a century.98 The repeal of these laws coincided with the rise of England’s next significant bubble in 1825.99
3. Gilded Age Bubbles in the United States: The Panic of 1869 and
Railway Boom of 1873
The United States experienced its own bubbles in the stock of mining
companies and railroads in the two decades after the Civil War. Just as in
Great Britain,100 the growth of national securities markets and the industrial
age spawned both tremendous financial booms and widespread swindling
of shareholders and securities fraud. The American versions of these bubbles replayed many of the fraudulent schemes in Britain, such as selling
shares in non-existent mines, fraudulent prospectuses, massive insider trading and self-dealing by officers and directors, and epic attempts by speculators, such as Jay Gould, to manipulate stock prices and corner the market.101
Gould and other financial “robber barons,” such as Jim Fisk, Daniel
Drew and Cornelius Vanderbilt, manipulated the capital markets with the
acquiescence, and, at times, the participation of lawmakers.102 This acquiescence was assured due to the classic confluence of laissez-faire philosophy and the full array of improper influence, including bribery.103 One of
94

See BALEN, supra note 82, at 169, 175–76, 181.
See id. at 207–10.
BALEN, supra note 82, at 216–20.
97
1734, 7 Geo. 2, c. 8; CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 88.
98
CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 88, 90. The bubble also prompted more drastic proposals to outlaw speculation and securities brokering that never passed. See id. at 88.
99
BANNER, supra note 63, at 79 (citing 1825, 6 Geo. 4, c. 91). This 19th century bubble is summarized infra note 300 and accompanying text.
100
The British bubbles of this age are described infra notes 301, 304 and accompanying text.
101
See generally CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 169–90 (describing speculation in the mining industry and Gould’s manipulation of railroad stock); ROBERT SOBEL, PANIC ON WALL STREET 115–96
(1968) (describing the major players in the postwar boom).
102
See SOBEL, supra note 101, at 126–33.
103
See CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 174–77; SOBEL, supra note 101, at 126–33, 167.
95
96
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the most egregious examples of this behavior came when Jay Gould attempted to corner the gold market in 1869 by exploiting inside information
on the monetary policy of the corrupt Grant administration.104 Gould’s
failure in this attempt triggered the Panic of 1869.105 Greatly enriched by
his market manipulation, Gould shielded himself from creditors and lawsuits for breach of contract through twelve injunctions and court orders
issued by judges whom he controlled.106
But railroad speculation continued, fueled by huge federal land grants
to the railroad companies, which curried favor with prominent politicians
through outright bribes and extending improper loans.107 But the news of a
series of scandals involving massive securities fraud and political corruption—most notably the Crédit Mobilier108 and Pacific Mail Steamship
Company109—shook the confidence of investors, and contributed to the
crash of 1873.110 This crash witnessed not only a collapse in stock prices,
but also the failure of prominent brokerage houses, runs on banks, and the
worst depression the nation had faced to that time.111
The Panic of 1869 prompted a Congressional investigation that exposed Gould’s machinations.112 The political and legal repercussions of
the crash of 1873 were more severe. The Grant administration became
mired in corruption scandals and the Democratic Party made large gains in
the Congressional elections of 1874.113 The gold standard and tighter
monetary policy returned with the enactment of the Resumption of Specie
Act in 1875,114 and the country became gripped by what would become a
decades-long conflict over whether, which, and to what extent, precious
104
See CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 180–83. Even his failure to influence Grant did not derail
Gould’s manipulation of the gold market, which continued as other traders assumed his attempts at
improper influence succeeded. See id. at 181–83; SOBEL, supra note 101, at 140–49.
105
Cf. SOBEL, supra note 101, at 149 (treating with skepticism Gould’s denial that he was “in no
way instrumental in creating the panic”).
106
SOBEL, supra note 101, at 149. This boom followed a number of other railways schemes that
profited due to official corruption. See, e.g., id. at 123–24 (describing Daniel Drew’s manipulation of
the Erie Railroad). Chancellor also discusses how corrupt state and local legislators in New York
facilitated the cornering of stocks in two Harlem railroads in 1863 and 1864. CHANCELLOR, supra note
8, at 175–76.
107
CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 175, 183; SOBEL, supra note 101, at 168.
108
In the 1872 Crédit Mobilier scandal, Oakes Ames, a railway promoter and member of Congress, gained support for a complex scheme of graft by distributing shares in the holding company that
benefited from the graft to prominent politicians, including future President James Garfield and former
Vice President Schuyler Colfax. CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 175; SOBEL, supra note 101, at 165.
109
The Pacific Mail Steamship Company scandal involved lucrative government contracts obtained through bribery of politicians. See SOBEL, supra note 101, at 165.
110
See id. at 171–80 (describing Wall Street’s panicked reaction to the collapse of the railroad
stocks and government scandals).
111
Id. at 175–92.
112
Id. at 149.
113
Id. at 195, 197; Irwin Unger, The Business Community and the Origins of the 1875 Resumption
Act, 35 BUS. HIST. REV. 247, 252–53 (1961).
114
Ch. 15, 18 Stat. 296 (1875).
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metals would back the dollar.115 Robert Sobel argues that beyond these
specific and immediate reactions, the bursting of the 1873 economic bubble resulted in a substantial shift in the focus of American politics and law:
The 1873 panic was not merely a severe jolt to the economy;
it marked the end of the era dominated by problems of slavery and secession (despite the fact that Reconstruction would
continue for another four years) and the beginning of one in
which monetary and class issues would occupy center
stage.116
The Supreme Court was also swept up in this transformation.117 The
Court reacted to financial crises in the post-Civil War era by sanctioning
the federal government’s ability to print paper money.118 The Court thus
“broadened substantially the terms of the government’s involvement in the
economy, particularly with respect to the effect economic legislation might
have on individual rights.”119
4. The 1920s Stock Market
The stock market of the roaring twenties was a fertile ground for securities fraud. The following is only the briefest of summaries of the widespread fraud during this period and the vast financial regulatory apparatus
that was constructed during the New Deal to combat this fraud.120 Operators of investment pools devised elaborate schemes to manipulate stock
prices and insider trading was prevalent.121 The primary U.S. securities
laws enacted in wake of the 1929 crash were designed to combat the
fraudulent and manipulative practices employed in the decade before.122
115

See SOBEL, supra note 101, at 197–99.
Id. at 193.
117
See Levy, supra note 59, at 827–41 (analyzing the development of Supreme Court opinions
handed down in reaction to the financial crises of the post-Civil War period).
118
Id. at 834.
119
Id. at 835. This passage refers to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Juilliard v. Greenman, 110
U.S. 421 (1884) and Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870). For a fascinating analysis of how the
justices in these cases wrestled with reconciling federal power to deal with financial emergencies with
the formalism of Court precedent that had limited government powers and elevated individual economic rights, see Levy, supra note 59, at 835–41.
120
For excellent introductions to the booming stock market of the 1920s, including the widespread fraud of that period, and the political aftermath of the crash, see generally CHANCELLOR, supra
note 8, at 191–232; FRASER, supra note 59, at 411–71.
121
See, e.g., MALKIEL, supra note 53, at 47–49 (describing instances of investment pooling and
short selling prior to the 1929 crash).
122
There are several excellent historical accounts of the many mutations of securities fraud during
the 1920s and how the prevention of their recurrence shaped federal securities law. See, e.g., Steve
Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385
(1990) (recounting the events preceding the enactment of section 10(b) and postulating that the provision was intended to grant the SEC broad powers to regulate any activity that might contribute to
speculation). For accounts of how the federal securities laws were designed to combat the types of
fraud of the 1920s from some of the principal architects of these laws, see William O. Douglas, Pro116
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The investment frenzy of the 1920s flourished in a political climate that
disfavored government regulation and where progressivism was in retreat.123
Wall Street came to dominate the politics of the nation, and dictated public
policy through what has been deemed “crony capitalism.”124 Presidents Coolidge and Hoover were elected on laissez-faire platforms; in the words of Coolidge, “the business of America is business.”125 Coolidge relaxed enforcement
of federal antitrust laws, paving the way for a wave of mergers, and dramatically reduced taxes on the wealthy, corporations and capital gains, fueling
further investment in stocks.126 Largely unregulated and highly leveraged,
utility companies became the subject of their own bubble.127
The collapse of the 1920s stock market and the onset of the Great Depression of course led to the greatest expansion of government regulation
in U.S. history. Congress reacted to the misdeeds of Wall Street by creating the Securities and Exchange Commission, mandating the separation of
commercial and investment banks in the Glass-Steagall Act,128 and creating
the modern securities regulatory regime, including the Securities Act of
1933,129 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,130 and the Public Utilities
Holding Company Act of 1935.131
5. The 1960s Boom in Conglomerate Stocks
In a harbinger of the SEC’s fight against earnings management in the
1990s,132 the mania for stocks of U.S. conglomerates in the sixties gave rise
to and fed off of a number of deceptive accounting practices used to inflate
earnings.133 These practices became the subject of extensive securities
fraud litigation after the stock prices of these conglomerates crashed.134
tecting the Investor, 23 YALE L. REV. 521 (1934) (discussing the Securities Act of 1933 and its perceived shortcomings); James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 29 (1959) (describing policymaking reaction to the 1929 crash).
123
See FRASER, supra note 59, at 375 (characterizing the 1920s as a decade in which “government
bent its efforts to serve the narrowest interests of the business classes”).
124
Id.
125
CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 197, 222–23.
126
Id. at 193, 197.
127
Id. at 207–08.
128
Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162, repealed in part by Gramm-Leach Bliley Act of
1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338.
129
Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2000)).
130
Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78lll (2000)).
131
Ch. 687, 49 Stat. 838 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (2000)).
132
See generally David Millon, Why is Corporate Management Obsessed with Quarterly Earnings and What Should Be Done About It?, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 890 (2002) (describing current
literature on, and SEC efforts against, earnings management).
133
For a primer on these accounting techniques, see MALKIEL, supra note 53, at 62–69; see also
ANDREW TOBIAS, THE FUNNY MONEY GAME (1971).
134
Securities fraud litigation involving one of the most prominent conglomerates, National Student Marketing Corp., led to a seminal decision on the liability of outside counsel for aiding and abetting securities fraud. See SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 701, 714–15 (D.D.C.
1978).
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Although the SEC expressed concern about these practices, forceful attempts to regulate them came only after the crash.135 Fraudulent schemes
also benefited from a period of looser enforcement of the securities laws by
the SEC dating back to the Eisenhower administration.136 The Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission did not intervene in the mergers of the conglomerate wave because officials narrowly read their statutory
authority and concluded that it did not extend to conglomerate mergers.137
After the crash of conglomerate stocks and the stocks of other “hot”
companies, the SEC responded to the pervasive use of deceptive accounting practices that had been used to inflate the earnings of conglomerates
after mergers by implementing a host of accounting rules, including requirements that corporations report earnings on a “fully diluted” basis in
their securities filings.138 The SEC also enacted an array of broker-dealer
regulations and launched a broad investigation of the American Exchange
in an effort to crack down on market manipulation schemes that had run
rampant during the conglomerate boom.139 Only in 1968 did the Federal
Trade Commission announce that it would investigate the conglomerate
merger movement.140
The pattern outlined in the brief capsule histories above—a laissezfaire political climate, deregulation, political corruption, and even government promotion of bubbles and epidemics of fraud during the rise of a
bubble, followed by a dramatic political, legal and regulatory reaction in
the wake of a bubble burst—appear in stock market bubbles other than
those described above. The Appendix provides a chart summarizing these
phenomena as observed in four additional stock market bubbles. These
phenomena also appear outside the Anglo-American context, and can be
found in the Argentine loan bubble in the 1880s141 and the bubble that enveloped the Japanese economy in the late 1980s.142
135
MALKIEL, supra note 53, at 67. For an account of the political resistance to regulation of financial markets during this time, see DAVID L. WESTERN, BOOMS, BUBBLES AND BUSTS IN US STOCK
MARKETS 108–09 (2004).
136
JAMES BURK, VALUES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE UNDER
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 103 (1988) (arguing that the “fiscal evisceration” of the SEC and the “recession of strict federal oversight” of the capital markets under the Eisenhower administration led to
“an efflorescence of fraudulent stock issues and speculative trading abuses”).
137
JAMES R. WILLIAMSON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY DURING THE KENNEDY-JOHNSON
YEARS 36 (1995).
138
MALKIEL, supra note 53, at 65, 67.
139
WESTERN, supra note 135, at 109–110.
140
MALKIEL, supra note 53, at 67.
141
See SHLEIFER, supra note 12, at 171–73.
142
See CHRISTOPHER WOOD, THE BUBBLE ECONOMY 164–69 (1992) (documenting how the
tightly intertwined relationship of financial regulators and industry in Japan led to government policies
that failed to curb market excesses). The collapse of the bubble prompted the initiation of potentially
revolutionary changes in Japanese securities and financial laws. See id. at 163–65. See generally
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of a Central Bank in a Bubble Economy, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1053
(1996) (discussing the Bank of Japan’s pivotal role in the creation and ultimate bursting of the Japanese
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B. The 1990s Bubble: From a Decade of Deregulation to Sarbanes-Oxley
Following historical form, the decade preceding the NASDAQ implosion in 2000 witnessed dramatic deregulation of the securities industry.143
This deregulation occurred through both Congressional action and prominent
judicial rulings. First, in 1995 and 1998 Congress, under pressure from Wall
Street interest groups—large securities issuers, investment banks, accounting
firms, and private securities law firms—passed two laws that placed high
hurdles in the way of private securities litigation against securities issuers
and financial intermediaries.144 A few of the reforms implemented by the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)145 included:
•
•
•
•

raising the pleading standards for securities class actions;146
replacing the “joint and several liability” previously imposed on defendants in private securities litigation with proportional liability,
unless the defendant is found to have knowingly violated the law;147
precluding RICO laws from being used to obtain treble damages in
securities fraud cases;148 and
adopting an expansive safe-harbor for “forward-looking” information provided in securities disclosure.149

Three years after enacting PSLRA, Congress acted again to narrow the
forms of relief available to plaintiffs in securities fraud litigation. Among
other things, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
(SLUSA) precluded class actions alleging securities fraud from being
brought in state courts.150 At the end of the decade, Congress acted again,
not to lower securities law liability but to change the entire landscape of
the securities industry. In 1999, Congress repealed one of the centerpieces
of the New Deal era securities laws, the Glass-Steagall Act, and thus erased
six-decade-old legal barriers between commercial and investment banking
activities.151
economic bubble).
143
See WESTERN, supra note 135, at 102–03; John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s
About the Gatekeepers, Stupid”, 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1409–10 (2002).
144
Coffee, supra note 143, at 1409–10; Stephen Labaton, Now Who, Exactly, Got Us into This?,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2002, at B1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
145
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2000)).
146
PSLRA sec. 101(b), § 21D(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (2000)); see Joel
Seligman, Rethinking Private Securities Litigation, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 105–06 (2004).
147
Sec. 101(b), § 21D(g)(2) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(2) (2000)); see Seligman, supra note 146, at 107.
148
Sec. 107 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000)).
149
Sec. 102(a), § 27A(c) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c) (2000)); see Seligman, supra note 146, at 106.
150
Pub. L. No. 105-353, sec. 101(a)(1), § 16(b), 112 Stat. 3227, 3228 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77p(b) (2000)); Coffee, supra note 143, at 1410.
151
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999) (repealing
20 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377 (1994)).
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Second, some of the interest groups that pushed for the passage of
these statutes were also successful in beating back or diluting attempts to
impose new obligations on securities market intermediaries. The most
glaring example is the accounting industry’s largely successful campaign at
the end of the Clinton administration to curtail SEC Chairman Arthur
Levitt’s attempts to restrict the scope of non-audit services that accountants
could provide to clients whose financial statements they audited.152 Levitt
ultimately proved to be a Cassandra, as these non-audit relationships compromised the objectivity of auditors and have been blamed for the failure of
accountants to adequately police the accounting of securities issuers.153
Third, prominent court rulings during the 1990s placed new restrictions
on securities lawsuits and thus lowered the potential liability of securities
issuers and their representatives. Two Supreme Court decisions epitomized this trend. In 1991, Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson shortened the statute of limitations for securities fraud actions.154 Then in 1994, the Court’s ruling in Central Bank of Denver v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver eliminated certain secondary liability
causes of action against defendants for “aiding and abetting” primary violators of securities laws.155 Beyond these high profile cases, the 1990s witnessed judicial formulation or further development of a number of different
doctrines, including the “bespeaks caution” doctrine156 and the “no fraud
by hindsight” doctrine,157 that curtailed the remedies available to plaintiffs
in securities fraud cases.158
152
See Floyd Norris, 3 Big Accounting Firms Assail S.E.C.’s Proposed Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES,
July 27, 2000, at C9 [hereinafter Norris, 3 Big], available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. Four
accounting firms and the SEC under Levitt ultimately agreed to diluted regulations on auditor independence that imposed much milder restrictions on the non-audit services that accounting firms could
provide to the clients whose financial statements they audited than were originally proposed. Floyd
Norris, Accounting Firms Accept Rule to Limit Conflicts of Interest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2000, at A1
[hereinafter Norris, Accounting Firms], available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
153
See Coffee, supra note 143, at 1411–12. For Levitt’s own account of his efforts to reform accounting practices and auditor independence and the stiff resistance he faced due to the political influence of accounting firms, see ARTHUR LEVITT WITH PAULA DWYER, TAKE ON THE STREET 128–39
(2002) and WESTERN, supra note 135, at 103.
154
501 U.S. 350, 359–61 (1991). The ruling bars any federal claims not filed by plaintiffs within
one year of when they should have known of the alleged violation and in no event later than three years
after the alleged violation. Id. at 360; Coffee, supra note 143, at 1409 & n.29.
155
511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994); Coffee, supra note 143, at 1409.
156
See, e.g., In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371 (3d Cir. 1993)
(“[C]autionary language [in a prospectus], if sufficient, renders the alleged omissions or misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of law.”).
157
E.g., DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627–28 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[P]laintiffs may not
proffer the different financial statements and rest. Investors must point to some facts suggesting that
the difference is attributable to fraud.”).
158
See Marc I. Steinberg, Curtailing Investor Protection Under the Securities Laws: Good for the
Economy?, 55 SMU L. REV. 347, 350–51 (2002); Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68
BROOK. L. REV. 407, 433 (2002). The Supreme Court created additional limitations in the 1990s on the
ability of plaintiffs in private securities litigation to obtain relief. In Gustafson v. Alloyd, the Supreme
Court limited liability under Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act to initial sales in connection with a
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Finally, not only did the risk of private enforcement abate in the 1990s,
but the risk of public enforcement actions brought by the SEC against
gatekeepers also dropped, as the SEC changed its enforcement priorities.159
The fall of the NASDAQ in 2000 and the subsequent exposure of widespread corporate fraud prompted a dramatic legislative and regulative response, albeit one whose long-term effectiveness is still being hotly debated.160 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the SEC regulations it mandated instituted a broad array of securities law and corporate governance reforms,
including:
•

•
•
•
•

requirements that executive officers of public companies certify
the accuracy of their company’s quarterly and annual SEC filings,
and the existence of internal controls to ensure the integrity of
company disclosure;161
a mandate that every public company create an audit committee;162
the establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board to oversee the accounting industry and its auditing of public
company financial statements;163
a limit on the services that auditors can perform for the companies
whose public financial statements they audit;164 and
regulation of the conduct of private securities lawyers in advising

statutory prospectus and thus precluded liability under that section for ordinary or secondary trading. 513
U.S. 561 (1995); LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4206–4220 (3d ed. 2004).
159
Coffee, supra note 143, at 1410 & n.33.
160
For a small sample of the legal scholarship analyzing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and
other regulatory reactions to the epidemic of fraud epitomized by the Enron scandal, see generally
William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48
VILL. L. REV. 1023 (2003) (criticizing the post-Enron focus on principle-based accounting standards);
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and It Just
Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003) (arguing that despite being less profound than advertised,
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s sheer complexity may effect some worthwhile reform); Larry E. Ribstein,
Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2003) (questioning whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will perform better than market
forces in preventing fraud); Romano, supra note 6; Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities
Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859 (2003) (listing
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as the latest evidence of the “federalization of corporate governance”); Jeffrey
N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information Order of SarbanesOxley (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 216, 2003), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=391363 (criticizing provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley Act that require
immediate “price-perfecting” disclosure of material corporate developments).
161
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745, 777 (codified at 15
U.S.C.S. § 7241 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 109-89)); Management’s Reports on Internal Control
Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 68 Fed.
Reg. 36,636, 36,637 (June 18, 2003) (codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R. (2005)).
162
Sarbanes-Oxley Act sec. 301, § 10A(m) (codified at 15 U.S.C.S. § 78j-1(m) (LEXIS through
Pub. L. No. 109-89)).
163
Id. § 101(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C.S. § 7211(a) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 109-89)).
164
Id. sec. 201(a), § 10A(g)–(h) (codified at 15 U.S.C.S. § 78j-1(g)–(h)); Strengthening the
Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, 68 Fed. Reg. 6,006, 6,010 (Feb. 5,
2003) (codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R. (2005)).
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public corporations.165
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act represented only the first act. New regulations
addressing security analyst conflicts of interest were passed by the SEC, the
National Association of Securities Dealers and the New York Stock Exchange166 in the wake of a widely publicized investigation into analyst practices during the 1990s by the New York State Attorney General.167 SEC
enforcement actions and private litigation regarding the Enron scandals also
heralded substantial increases in the liability of investment banks, auditors
and law firms for the actions of public companies that they advise.168
165
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
205 (2005)).
166
See 17 C.F.R. § 242.501(a) (2005) (requiring securities analysts to certify that views expressed
in research reports reflect personal views of the analyst and to disclose any compensation or payments
received for specific recommendations); Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the New York
Stock Exchange, Inc., 68 Fed. Reg. 45,875 (Aug. 4, 2003) (approving NASD and NYSE rule changes
regarding security analyst conflicts of interest).
167
New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer launched a widely publicized investigation into
the practices of stock analysts at major Wall Street firms. Spitzer’s investigation found substantial
evidence of analysts publicly touting the prospects of companies that they privately believed were not
worthwhile investments in order to promote their firm’s investment banking services to these companies. See John Cassidy, The Investigation, NEW YORKER, Apr. 7, 2003, at 54, available at LEXIS,
News Library, NEWYRK File; Affidavit of Eric R. Dinallo, In re Spitzer, No. 02-401522 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Apr. 8, 2002), at 3, available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/MerrillL.pdf. This
investigation culminated in a settlement where, without admitting guilt, Merrill Lynch and other large
investment banks agreed to institute a system of firewalls to insulate their securities analysts from
influence by their investment banking businesses and to pay multimillion dollar fines. Cassidy, supra.
168
The SEC entered into a settlement agreement with two investment banks that advised Enron on
a series of transactions that according to the SEC, “helped Enron mislead its investors by characterizing
what were essentially loan proceeds as cash from operating activities.” Press Release, SEC, SEC
Settles Enforcement Proceedings against J.P. Morgan Chase and Citigroup (July 28, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-87.htm. These banks agreed to pay $255 million in fines to
investors. See id. Although neither bank admitted guilt, limiting the precedential value of this settlement, this settlement serves as a warning of the SEC’s intention to prosecute advisors of public corporations who help construct transactions designed to mislead investors.
To some extent, judicial “deregulation” also reversed course in the aftermath of the fraud epidemic. For example, a prominent ruling in the Enron litigation has held that secondary actors—
including lawyers and accountants—may be held liable as primary participants in securities fraud if
plaintiffs can prove these secondary actors had requisite knowledge that misrepresentations authored by
these actors would be used to mislead investors. Quoting the SEC’s brief, the court stated:
[W]hen a person, acting alone or with others, creates a misrepresentation [on which
the investor-plaintiffs relied], the person can be liable as a primary violator . . . if . . .
he acts with the requisite scienter. Moreover it would not be necessary for a person
to be the initiator of a misrepresentation in order to be a primary violator. Provided
that a plaintiff can plead and prove scienter, a person can be a primary violator if he
or she writes misrepresentations for inclusion in a document to be given to investors,
even if the idea for those misrepresentations came from someone else.
In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 692–93 (S.D. Tex. 2002)
(citations omitted) (alterations in original).
This ruling thus sidestepped the Supreme Court’s ruling in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1991), that precluded “aiding and abetting” liability under Rule 10b-5
actions. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. If a wide number of other courts adopt this reasoning, then the scope of Central Bank of Denver would be dramatically limited. For reactions from the
securities bar and legal scholars on this case, see Kurt Eichenwald, A Higher Standard for Corporate
Advice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2002, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
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IV. THE INTERACTION OF BUBBLES AND THE LEGAL REGIME:
THREE FEEDBACK CYCLES
The historical survey above reveals a clear correlation between deregulation during the rise of a bubble and sharp political reaction and re-regulation in
the aftermath of a bubble. Prominent behavioral finance economists have
identified parts of this pattern, but in the words of one of them, “a full model of
economics and politics of bubbles remains to be built.”169 This Part presents a
sketch of such a model and describes how laws, regulations and the market for
laws and regulations affect and are affected by bubbles. This Part argues that
bubbles not only feed off of, but also promote, the deregulation of capital markets and the under-enforcement of existing regulations. Part V analyzes how
speculative bubbles also dilute the effectiveness of those securities laws that
remain in effect by causing the deterioration of securities law compliance.
In turn, deregulation and deteriorated securities laws improve conditions
for both an outbreak of widespread securities fraud and the further inflation
of the speculative bubble.170 Bubbles and regulations are thus locked in a
tight, symbiotic relationship. This Part fleshes out this relationship by outlining a model of the interplay of three cycles—the business cycle, the cycle
of investor confidence/investor trust and the political economy/regulatory
cycle. Part IV.A describes these three cycles. Part IV.B analyzes how these
cycles generate positive feedback for each other during the inflation of a
stock market bubble. Part IV.C then looks at how the cycles reverse after a
bubble collapses. Part IV.D concludes by analyzing how this interaction
leads to procyclical regulation, or a perverse pattern of deregulation, as a
bubble inflates and the risk of an epidemic of securities fraud rises, and reregulation only after the epidemic has started, the bubble collapses and investor trust has been damaged.
A. Three Cycles Described
Of the three cycles mentioned above, the business cycle, or the macroeconomic cycle of growth and recession, is the best known and most studied.171 The idea of a cycle of investor confidence and investor trust builds
upon economic evidence of periodic fluctuations in investor expectations
169

SHLEIFER, supra note 12, at 174.
For an alternative model of how bubbles are created by social feedback cycles, see Mitchel Y.
Abolafia & Martin Kilduff, Enacting Market Crisis: The Social Construction of a Speculative Bubble,
33 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 177 (1988) (arguing that bubbles are socially constructed by the interaction of
competing self-interest social coalitions, including speculators, brokers, bankers, the media and regulators).
171
Economic research into the nature of the business cycle has a long history that is unfortunately
beyond the scope of this article. For a foundational work in this field, see 1 & 2 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,
BUSINESS CYCLES (1939). For an analysis of economic cycles and their impact on the effectiveness of
financial regulation, see Charles A.E. Goodhart, The Historical Pattern of Economic Cycles and Their
Interaction with Asset Prices and Financial Regulation, in ASSET PRICE BUBBLES, supra note 13, at 467.
170
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in the level of the economy and of the capital markets. Behavioral finance
economists have labeled this phenomenon “investor sentiment” and argued
that it creates the natural conditions for bubbles to grow and investors to
adopt positive feedback trading.172 But investor confidence also captures a
deeper insight that a functioning market depends on investor trust in the
integrity of that market and its institutions.
“Trust” has been the subject of a considerable body of recent legal
scholarship,173 and has been defined as a learned, internalized behavior
where one person comes to rely on, have confidence in, and believe in the
integrity of, another.174 Trust reflects a willingness to be vulnerable to possible exploitation by the recipient of that trust because of internalized beliefs,
and not merely because of a series of individual rational economic calculations.175 In the 1990s, political theorists, psychologists, economists and legal
scholars all analyzed trust as a form of “social capital” and explored how a
lack of widespread trust in society—trust in government, social institutions
and civil society—can hamper economic and political development.176
Lynn Stout applies this learning on trust to the securities markets, and
argues that investor confidence in the fairness of the market and in the
trustworthiness of market intermediaries has been dangerously eroded by
the recent epidemic of corporate scandals.177 If investors fear being defrauded by issuers, broker dealers, exchanges or other market intermediaries, or that the investment odds are otherwise rigged, they will no longer
invest in the stock market.178 But, investors can also overly trust the mar172
See SHILLER, supra note 12, at 45–52, 60–62. See generally Nicholas Barberis et al., A Model
of Investor Sentiment, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 307 (1998) (positing a mathematical model to explain the
“overreaction” and “underreaction” of investors that leads to bubbles).
173
See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2000) (exploring how the learned, socially
determined nature of trust is reflected in the structure of corporate law); Lawrence A. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425 (1993) (arguing that courts and legislatures have
jeopardized the integrity of corporate fiduciary law by ignoring the essential role of trust); Eric A.
Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises, 1997 WISC. L. REV.
567, 577–78 (discussing the role of trust in gifts and relational contracts); Carol M. Rose, Trust in the
Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531 (1995) (examining the resilience of trust in light of the notion
that pure rationality counsels against trusting others).
174
See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 173, at 1745–46.
175
See id. at 1745, 1750–53.
176
See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 10–11 (1995) (arguing that trust, being necessary for people to work together for common purposes, is essential to American civil society); Karen Cook, Trust in Society, in TRUST IN SOCIETY xi, xi
(Karen S. Cook ed., 2001) (discussing a national decline in trust of everything from prominent professionals to the very idea of a team or family); cf. Peter Brann & Margaret Foddy, Trust and the Consumption of a Deteriorating Common Resource, 31 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 615 (1987) (describing a study
that examined the relationship between trust and resource consumption).
177
See Stout, supra note 158, at 415–20 (comparing the reactions of a solely-rational investor and
a “trusting investor” in light of recent corporate scandals).
178
See Tamar Frankel, Regulation and Investors’ Trust in the Securities Markets, 68 BROOK. L.
REV. 439, 443 n.17, 448 (2002) (“[Investors] care about a fair, not necessarily a level, playing field. . . .
They are willing to lose fair and square but not to be taken by fraud.”).
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ket and place too much confidence in securities issuers, investments, investment advice and market intermediaries. The late 1990s witnessed a
multitude of schemes that exploited investors who failed to heed warning
signs that getting rich quickly involved a high risk of being defrauded.
Investor confidence and investor trust are inextricably linked.179
The third cycle, the political/legal/regulatory cycle, describes the pattern
of increasing and decreasing levels of regulation according to demand in the
political marketplace. Economists, political scientists and legal scholars
have long debated and formed elaborate competing theories to explain what
causes regulation and, since the 1970s and 1980s, deregulation, with various
public choice theories gaining prominence.180 The narrative below in Parts
IV.B–C adopts an ecumenical approach, with regulation waxing and waning
according to the changing interests and resources available to various political and economic groups. These interests and resources are greatly affected
by economic cycles as described below. One critical factor stands out: larger, more diffuse groups, such as retail investors, encounter greater difficulty
in organizing themselves for collective action, and only exert significant
pressure on regulators when their interests are severely affected.
B. Rise of a Bubble: Pressure to Deregulate
The formation of a bubble involves positive feedback among the three
cycles. As macroeconomic factors generate both investor wealth and profit
opportunities, investor confidence in the market rises. This leads to higher
stock prices, and, in turn, greater economic investment. The booming economy and surging investor confidence reinforce investor trust in market institutions. But trusting investors can become overly trusting. Because they
would have little reason to question a market that provides consistent high
returns to them, investors can fail to notice evidence calling into question the
integrity of the market. Investors—because they suffer from behavioral biases and engage in irrational herding,181 or because they rationally base their
investment decisions on the decisions of other investors (a phenomenon
known as an information cascade)182—observe others placing their trust in
179

See Stout, supra note 158, at 437.
Economist Sam Peltzman provides one version of a public choice explanation (or what he labels the “economic theory of regulation”) for regulation and deregulation. Sam Peltzman, The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation, 1989 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1. For a critical appraisal of public choice theory, see Mark Kelman, On
Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and ‘Empirical’ Practice of the Public
Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1998).
181
See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the behavior of “noise traders”).
182
An information cascade occurs when individuals make decisions in sequence, and, after observing the behavior decisions of those who acted before, it is optimal for an individual to follow that
behavior regardless of his or her own information. For two influential articles in the economic literature on information cascades, see Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q. J.
ECON. 797 (1992); Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural
180
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the market and in market participants, and decide to do the same.
Since trust is a behavioral phenomenon, the behavioral biases that contribute to investor euphoria and the development of a bubble can lead to an
excess of trust in the integrity of market participants, just as they can lead
to excesses in market prices.183 The availability bias causes individuals to
underestimate the possibility of being defrauded as memories of previous
epidemics of fraud and corporate scandals fade with time and rising stock
prices.184 Investors’ overoptimism and overconfidence in their own investing abilities may mean that they discount the probability of being defrauded and overestimate their ability to detect fraud.185 Similarly, the
phenomena of framing, belief perseverance, and anchoring contribute to the
suggestibility of investors and to their reluctance to change their opinions
on the trustworthiness of the market.186 Excessive trust in the integrity of
the market explains why the history of bubbles is to a large extent the history of massive financial fraud.
The cycle of investor trust is mirrored by the regulatory cycle. As
noted in Part III, market booms and bubbles coincide with periods of laissez-faire economic policy and financial and securities deregulation. Looser
regulation may free up capital and spur economic growth. Some economists believe that a shift in government regulations or expectations of such
a shift may trigger speculative bubbles.187 But financial booms also affect
the market for regulations; booms and bubbles generate feedback for the
political economy, just as they do for the financial economy. Economic
actors, particularly securities issuers and the financial industry, that stand
to reap enormous gains from booms, push for deregulation of capital markets.188 Booming capital markets then give these actors greater cash resources and incentives to push for more deregulation.189
As the capsule histories in Part III document, these economic interests
influence government officials through a multitude of channels, ranging
from outright corruption and cooptation to the modern practice of camChange as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992).
183
See supra Part II. For a more detailed discussion of the ways in which behavioral biases contribute to the development of bubbles, see De Bondt, supra note 13, at 205–16.
184
Supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law and Econ.
Studies, Working Paper No. 214, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=373581.
185
See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
186
See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text.
187
See generally ROBERT D. FLOOD & PETER M. GARBER, SPECULATIVE BUBBLES, SPECULATIVE ATTACKS, AND POLICY SWITCHING (1994) (discussing the effects of changing policy on price
bubbles).
188
See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 9, at 82–84 (discussing the financial industry’s pressure on Congress to deregulate in response to the boom of the 1990s).
189
See id. at 97 (explaining that the prosperity of Citigroup was made possible by the repeal of the
Glass-Steagall Act).
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paign contributions. Boom times translate into more employment opportunities for bureaucrats in the private sector and thus the revolving door spins
faster. Regulators, of course, have less incentive to threaten potential future employers. The economic interests arrayed against securities and financial deregulation are few (unless deregulation would tear down barriers
to entry that protect weaker firms in regulated industries) and thus regulators face little political pressure to resist deregulation.190
Yet regulators face other, less sinister pressures to acquiesce to deregulation, as a booming economy delights constituents. Therefore, once a
bubble has formed, regulators face enormous pressure to refrain from
pricking it for fear of upsetting the economic applecart.191 Behavioral biases also afflict regulators and policymakers.192 The availability bias
means that, as time passes since the last financial crisis, regulators and
policymakers discount the potential for new crises and the need for regulations to avert those crises. This creates a condition that scholars of international financial crises have labeled “disaster myopia.”193 Regulators and
policymakers may also excessively and subconsciously discount the expected future costs of a burst bubble.194 Moreover, the election cycle
means that the costs may be realized on another politician’s watch.
C. After the Bubble: The Regulatory Impulse
At the bursting of a bubble, these three cycles reverse drastically; the
business, the investor confidence/investor trust and the regulatory cycles
generate negative feedback that reinforces the reversal of the other cycles.
First, the stock market in free fall can devastate investor confidence in the
stock market. Moreover, the implosion of a bubble, especially when combined with revelations of massive fraud, can decimate investor confidence
in the integrity of the market and its institutions.195
The sharp drops in the stock prices and investor confidence can have
dire spillover effects for the economy as a whole, and even infect the international economy.196 In particular, the potential fallout of a bubble burst190
Geoffrey Miller provides an account of how these various political disincentives prevented the
Japanese Central Bank from acting against the bubble that gripped that nation’s real estate and capital
markets at the end of the 1980s. See generally Miller, supra note 142.
191
Id. at 1055.
192
See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV.
1, 21–35 (2003) (cataloging behavioral biases afflicting the Securities and Exchange Commission).
193
Jack M. Guttentag & Richard J. Herring, DISASTER MYOPIA IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING 3–4
(1986).
194
This stems from a behavioral bias known as “hyperbolic discounting.” See Jolls et al., supra
note 30, at 1539 (citing David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q. J. ECON.
443, 445–46 (1997)).
195
See Stout, supra note 158, at 411–12.
196
The epidemic metaphor often used to describe bubbles, contagion, reappears in the label for
this phenomenon. Kindleberger gives examples of both domestic and international contagion following
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ing can lead to a severe credit crunch.197 The drop in share prices can force
banks to call loans collateralized by stock, creating the potential for cascading credit problems.198 Plummeting investor confidence affects consumer
confidence, and, at times, confidence in the integrity of banks and the financial system as a whole, which can lead to runs on banks and general
financial panic.199 This is of course only the crudest summary of the macroeconomic effects of a burst bubble; the economic and legal literature
exploring the pathways and probabilities of bubbles leading to economic
contagion is voluminous.200
The collapse of a bubble also has a violent effect on the regulatory cycle, by generating a strong political reaction against speculation. Similarly,
the fraud that often accompanies bubbles creates a public demand for new
laws and regulations to punish malfeasance in the market. In fact, one
scholar attributes most of the major developments in securities laws over
the last three centuries to responses to collapsed bubbles, stock crashes and
related financial crises.201
D. The Result of the Three Cycles: Procyclical Regulation
These three interrelated cycles combine to create an irrational pattern
of rising investor confidence when caution should prevail, and a dearth of
investor confidence or even investor panic, when stocks prices have fallen
to more reasonable levels and the regulatory police have already been
alerted. The regulatory cycle follows a similarly perverse pattern, with less
regulation at a moment of irrationality in the market and greater probability
of fraud, and a sharp regulatory reaction after the damage has already been
done.202 There is a strong possibility that a delayed regulatory reaction
could prove to be somewhat unnecessary, as the conditions that created the
bubble and sapped investor confidence—particularly fraud—have already
dissipated.203 The market, in an apparently grossly inefficient manner, has
corrected for the lack of appropriate regulatory safeguards and chastened
the collapse of a bubble. See KINDLEBERGER, supra note 49, at 109–16 (discussing domestic contagion); id. at 117–37 (discussing international contagion).
197
Id. at 96–97.
198
See id. at 66–67 (describing the increase in loan calls and the “paralyz[ation]” of the credit system during the 1929 stock market crash).
199
See id. at 105–07.
200
For a collection of other articles analyzing the connection between bubbles and domestic and
international financial crises, see generally ASSET PRICE BUBBLES, supra note 13.
201
Banner, supra note 14, at 850.
202
For an analysis of financial regulation becoming less stringent as a bubble develops and more
stringent after a bubble bursts, see generally Frankel, supra note 178. Frankel argues that this pattern
results from cycles in investor confidence in the capital markets, which in turn affect investor demand
for regulation. See id. at 440–44. Investor demand for regulation coincides to a large degree with
demand for regulation by financial institutions that want to build investor confidence in capital markets.
Id. at 441–42.
203
See id. at 443 (suggesting that investor confidence is directly related to shifts in stock prices).
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malfeasant corporations and overly trusting investors alike.204 Chastened
investors remain wary of being defrauded again, and chastened issuers and
market intermediaries bid to restore investor confidence.205
Commentators further argue that post-bubble regulations chill business
activity and dampen capital formation at a moment when the economy is
already reeling. For example, it has been argued that the Bubble Act and
Sir John Barnard’s Act together stifled capital formation and the development of corporate law in England for a century after the South Sea Bubble.206 Similarly, the collapse of the Mississippi Bubble in France has been
blamed for retarding efforts to reform French finances during the following
sixty years.207 These concerns echo in the rhetoric of current backlash
against the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.208 But, paradoxically, these regulations
would be extremely difficult to remove initially due to strong public reaction against the bubble and the last epidemic of fraud.
Potentially overly obtrusive regulations not only irritate the economist’s sensibility, they also sow the seeds for the cycles to repeat. When
boom times return, a financial industry burdened with a multitude of regulations can make a politically persuasive argument that burdensome regulations are outdated. Memories of the last cycle—bubble and fraud—fade,
and the availability bias helps to make regulation seem less appealing.
This pattern leads to what economists have termed procyclical regulation: regulations that “do not bite in booms at all, but tighten significantly
during recessions.”209 Procyclicality leads to regulations that are undereffective and then potentially over-effective.210 Moreover, procyclicality
potentially exacerbates the severity of the business cycle.211 This procyclicality is worsened, because as Part V argues, bubbles not only lead to a
rollback of laws, they also dilute the effectiveness of surviving laws by
causing a deterioration in securities law compliance.
V. BUBBLES AND THE DETERIORATION OF SECURITIES LAW COMPLIANCE
The deregulation spurred by the rise of a bubble described in Part IV is
of course not total. Nevertheless, the rise of a bubble causes the decay of
even those regulations that are unaffected by deregulation. This Part analyzes how compliance with securities laws deteriorates during the rise of a
bubble, because the dynamics of a bubble, particularly the mass perception
204
Cf. id. at 446–48 (critiquing the market’s ability to sustain investor participation following a
breach of confidence).
205
Id. at 443–44.
206
CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 90.
207
SHLEIFER, supra note 12, at 171.
208
See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text.
209
Goodhart, supra note 171, at 474.
210
Id. at 476.
211
Id. at 474.
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that stock prices will continue to rise, erodes the deterrence value of antifraud rules. Bubbles thus skew the calculus of compliance for both securities issuers and market intermediaries.
Part V.A presents a model of the deterrence theory of antifraud provisions in the securities laws. Several scholars, notably John Coffee, have
argued that the deregulation of the 1990s undermined the deterrence effect
of antifraud rules and thus was a driver of the recent epidemic of fraud.212
But Part V.B takes a closer look at data on financial restatements—a rough
proxy for the occurrence of securities fraud—and concludes that deregulation alone cannot explain the epidemic of fraud. A comparison of the incidence of financial restatements in the 1990s with stock market indices implies that the “irrational exuberance” of the stock market played a strong
role in the outbreak of fraud.213
Part V.C then sets out a theory of how bubbles cause the deterioration
of securities law compliance by issuers and market intermediaries. This
theory details the modes in which the dynamics of a bubble erode the deterrent value of securities laws by changing the rational and extra-rational
calculus of compliance for issuers and market intermediaries. Part V.C
concludes by demonstrating that even those market participants who seek
to comply with the law are frustrated by rising information and agency
costs during a bubble.
Together, Parts IV and V seek to demonstrate that, by promoting deregulation of financial markets and undermining securities law compliance,
the inflation of a bubble promotes securities fraud. But, before launching
into the analysis, this basic argument should be placed in context. This
argument focuses essentially on the supply side of fraud, i.e., the incentives
of securities issuers, market intermediaries and other market participants to
engage in securities fraud. Bubbles also promote the demand side of fraud,
and much of the economic literature focuses on this aspect.214 As Part II
shows, behavioral finance economists have shown how bubbles inflate due
to the speculative investing of unsophisticated, irrational investors. Overoptimism, overconfidence and a host of other behavioral biases make these
noise traders attractive targets for the unscrupulous.215 Behavioral biases
cause investors to ignore warning signs of fraud and thus make the vast
disclosure system of federal securities laws less effective. Bubbles thus
212

See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 143, at 1414 (describing how the elimination of the six-month
holding period for exercised options enabled executives to “bail out” of an impending stock decline);
Coffee, supra note 184, at 10 (similar).
213
See SHILLER, supra note 12, at xii.
214
According to one of the most influential economists on bubbles, Charles Kindleberger, fraud
during bubbles is “demand determined” and results from the prevalence of foolhardy investors. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 49, at 76.
215
See supra notes 30–38 and accompanying text.
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decay the disclosure rules of federal securities law as well.216
But, securities disclosure is never rendered useless and the demand
side explanation of fraud is incomplete. While investors may be less wary
of fraud, no investor buys into an obviously fraudulent scheme and consents to being defrauded. Nevertheless, economic research demonstrates
that the behavioral biases of noise traders are particularly robust, such that
an array of policies designed to dampen the noise trading that creates bubbles have proven ineffective.217 Therefore, this Article focuses on the
“suppliers” of fraud, who likely would prove to be more susceptible to
different incentive structures.
A. Deregulation and Deterrence Theory
Several scholars have presented theories that the epidemic of fraud that
followed the collapse of the technology stock bubble in 2001 stemmed
from the deregulation of the securities industry (detailed in Part III.B).
Most notably, John Coffee has argued that Enron and similar scandals resulted from the failure of legal deterrence to prevent gatekeepers, particularly Enron’s auditors, from acquiescing to Enron’s fraud.218 Coffee’s research builds upon a long line of legal scholarship on the role of gatekeepers—intermediaries, such as auditors, stock analysts, underwriters, lawyers,
and rating agencies, that lend their reputation to securities issuers and allow
issuers to access capital markets—in policing those markets.219 Coffee
216

Coffee, supra note 143, at 1409–10; Coffee, supra note 184, at 25.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
218
Coffee, supra note 143, at 1403–05, 1409–10; Coffee, supra note 184, at 14–21.
219
For seminal works on the role of gatekeepers in policing the securities markets, see generally
Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916 (1998); Gilson & Kraakman,
supra note 39; Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability Necessary?, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD. 295 (1988); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984) [hereinafter Kraakman, Corporate]; Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986) [hereinafter Kraakman, Gatekeepers].
Over two decades of research, scholars have employed two definitions of gatekeepers. The
first definition focuses on the certification role of gatekeepers. This definition views gatekeepers as
“reputational intermediaries who provide verification and certification services to investors.” Coffee, supra note 143, at 1405. For other scholarship that employs this definition, see, for example,
Choi, supra, at 918. Under the second definition, gatekeepers restrict access to the market by securities issuers who do not conform to legal (and market) standards, and the gatekeeper stakes its
reputation on those firms who are granted access. See Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra, at 53 (defining gatekeepers as “private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers”).
Coffee is not alone in examining the failure of gatekeepers to police recent securities fraud. For
other recent works, see, for example, Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A
Voucher Financing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269 (2003); Jill E. Fisch &
Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097
(2003); Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the Regulation of
Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035 (2003); Assaf Hamdani, Assessing Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L.
REV. 53 (2003); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict
Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491 (2001).
217
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argues that the failure of deterrence stemmed from two dynamics of the
1990s: gatekeepers suffering from conflicts of interest that misaligned their
incentives,220 and lower legal liability.221
The second part of Coffee’s deterrence theory argues that acquiescence
in corporate fraud became more attractive because a decade of deregulation
lowered the legal liability of gatekeepers. As described above in Part III.B,
federal securities reform laws, Supreme Court rulings, judicial doctrines,
and changing SEC enforcement priorities dramatically lowered the liability
of gatekeepers (and securities issuers and their officers and directors) from
securities fraud litigation. Again, this lowering of liability was no accident; gatekeepers were an active force in pushing for these judicial and
legislative reforms.222
This theory meshes with the historical correlation between deregulation and epidemics of fraud during the rise of a bubble demonstrated in
Part III.A. It also builds on a long line of scholarship on the deterrence
mechanisms of securities law in general.223 Were an economist to model
the deterrence theory that undergirds the antifraud rules of the securities
law, the decision by a securities issuer or a market intermediary (such as a
gatekeeper) on whether to commit fraud would look something like B < >
Pd *((Pe * Ll) + Lr), where B represents the benefits to be realized from
committing fraud, Pd represents the probability of the fraud being detected,
Pe represents the probability of the securities laws being successfully en220
The competition for realizing more revenue from corporations compromised the role of
gatekeepers to police their clients. Coffee, supra note 143, at 1414. The much-analyzed conflicts of
interest in the 1990s were legion and included audit companies selling, and, ultimately, realizing
most of their revenue from, non-audit services to public companies, such as consulting services, id.
at 1415, stock analysts in investment banking firms coming under internal pressure to deliver positive ratings for companies from whom their firms were soliciting investment banking business, id. at
1407, and outside law firms taking equity stakes in their clients. See also John S. Dzienkowski &
Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer Independence: Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients, 81
TEX. L. REV. 405 (2002).
In each case, gatekeepers saw their interests become aligned more with pleasing their corporate
clients and seeing stock prices rise, and less in serving their traditional role as an independent watchdog; any potential reputational losses from acquiescing to client misdeed were dwarfed by the potential
business gains to gatekeepers.
This logic of misaligned incentives also explains the failure of corporate governance in the 1990s.
Because executives and directors received increasing amounts of compensation through stock and stock
options, they became obsessed with increasing short-term share prices to the detriment of their fiduciary roles. Coffee, supra note 143, at 1413–14. Thus the incentives of the “internal gatekeepers” of
companies became just as corrupted as the external gatekeepers. Id. at 1414.
221
Id. at 1409–10.
222
See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
223
Scholarship on deterrence theory grows out of the seminal analysis of Nobel laureate Gary
Becker. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in ESSAYS IN
THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 1 (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes eds., 1974).
For an analysis of deterrence theory and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see Michael A. Perino, Enron’s
Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 212, 2002), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=350540.
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forced, Ll represents legal liability under the securities laws, and Lr represents market, reputational and other non-legal losses.
Rational actors contemplating violating the law will do so if the benefits, B, outweigh the expected liability. Expected liability is initially contingent on the probability of fraud being detected and attributed to the
actor, Pd. Expected legal liability (assuming fraud is detected) equals the
legal liability under the securities laws, Ll, multiplied by the probability
that a legal case will be successfully prosecuted either by the government
or by private plaintiffs, Pe. The final variable, Lr, reflects the other nonlegal costs that a committer of fraud would incur if the fraud is detected,
regardless of the outcome of any legal claims. These costs include stock
market losses and reputational loss (which is particularly important for
gatekeepers, but also for issuers whose credibility in the marketplace with
stock analysts and investors is prized).
Coffee’s theories of misaligned incentives and under-deterrence due
to deregulation focuses on the benefits received from fraud, B, and the
legal liability under the securities laws, Ll. The misaligned incentives
theory shows how gatekeepers had more to gain from participating or
acquiescing in fraud and how deregulation lowered the value of legal
liability.224 But these are not the only factors at work. Part V.C discusses
how the dynamics of a bubble affected the other variables in the equation
and caused deterioration in compliance with securities laws.
B. Data on the Timing of Fraud: Deregulation as an Incomplete
Explanation
Although Coffee’s deterrence theory based on deregulation provides
an extremely compelling and useful explanation that has captured the
attention of policymakers, it does not fully capture the causes of the epidemic of fraud. Coffee’s deterrence/deregulation theory raises two questions. First, why, when the factors behind this theory—greater conflicts
of interest of gatekeepers and deregulation—occurred throughout the
1990s, did the epidemic of fraud appear only at the end of the decade?
Second, was the epidemic of fraud in the 1990s really a phenomenon
unique to the decade? The answers to both questions strongly suggest
that another factor played a major role in driving the epidemic.
With respect to the first question, deregulation and the proliferation of
conflicts of interest progressed steadily and incrementally throughout the
decade.225 A reasonable assumption would be that gatekeeper acquies224

See Coffee, supra note 143, at 1414–15.
One measure of growing conflicts of interest is the increasing percentage of auditor revenue derived from non-audit services. See Coffee, supra note 184, at 14. Two studies that together tracked this
percentage for major accounting firms in the years 1990, 1994–1996 and 1999 show a steady increase in
the percentage of auditor revenue derived from non-audit services over the decade. The Panel on Audit
225
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cence and the incidence of corporate fraud would also rise steadily and
incrementally. But this does not appear to be the case. Instead, corporate
fraud appears to have reached epidemic proportions only in the last years
of the decade.226 Financial restatements by corporations serve as a bellwether for the presence of fraud; restatements send a dire message to Wall
Street about the integrity of a company’s accounting and securities disclosure, and stock prices react swiftly and harshly. As Coffee notes, a number
of studies of restatements during the 1990s show a sharp spike occurring at
the end of the decade.227 Figure 1 shows the incidence of companies restating their earnings and companies restating their financial statements as a
whole from 1990 to 2000.

Figure 1

228

Number of Restatements, 1990–2000

The end of the decade witnessed not only a sharp rise in the number
of earnings and financial restatements, but in the severity of these restatements, as witnessed by stock price losses that occurred immediately
Effectiveness, Report and Recommendations 112 (2000), available at http://www.pobauditpanel.org/
download.html (breaking down the percentage of revenue for the Big 5 accounting firms among “accounting and auditing,” “tax” and “consulting” services for the years 1990 and 1999); Andrew Crockett et al.,
Conflicts of Interest in the Financial Services Industry 33 (2003) (breaking down the percentage of revenue
for the Big 6 accounting firms among “auditing and accounting,” “management advisory” and “tax” services for each of years 1994, 1995 and 1996). The author is not aware of any study showing the conflicts
of interest for other gatekeepers spiked at any point during the decade.
226
See Coffee, supra note 184, at 17 (showing that the number of earnings restatements by publicly held corporations skyrocketed between 1998 and 2000).
227
Id. at 16–18.
228
George B. Moriarty & Philip B. Livingston, Quantitative Measures of the Quality of Financial
Reporting, 17 FIN. EXEC., July/Aug. 2001, at 54–55 (2001). This data was also used by Coffee, supra
note 184, at 17 & n.27.
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after the announcement of a restatement. These losses for earnings and
financial restatements are depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2

229

Market Value of Losses due to Restatements, 1990–2000 (in billions of dollars)

This sharp spike in restatements at the end of the decade strongly suggests that another factor came into play in the late 1990s to drive the epidemic of fraud.
This paper posits that the most likely candidate is the irrational investor
behavior (what Alan Greenspan deemed “irrational exuberance”)230 that
propelled the stock market in the late 1990s. Robert Shiller cites the historically unprecedented spike in the price to earnings ratio of the U.S. stock
market from 1997 to 2000 as one measure of this exuberance (and one sign
that a stock market bubble had formed).231 Figure 3 displays the
price/earnings ratio from 1990 to 2000 calculated, using Shiller’s data, by
dividing the S&P Composite index (corrected for inflation) by the ten-year
moving average real earnings on that index.
This price earnings trend strongly correlates with the trends in earnings
restatements over this same decade described above. Comparing this
price/earnings data to the total number of restatements from 1990 to 2000
yields a correlation coefficient of 0.898527.232 Of course, the old maxim
229

Moriarty & Livingston, supra note 228, at 55.
SHILLER, supra note 12, at 3–4.
Id. at 7–8.
232
The correlation coefficient that comparing this price/earnings data to the total market value of
losses due to restatements is even higher at 0.909787. But one would expect a higher correlation in this
number because rising stock prices would be reflected in both price/earnings data and the market value
of losses due to restatements. Both of these coefficients reflect the correlation of (i) the average of
Shiller’s twelve monthly price to earnings ratio data points for each year (as described supra note 234)
and (ii) the annual numbers on restatements (supra note 228).
230
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that correlation doesn’t imply causation applies, but the data lends strong
support to a conclusion that a skyrocketing stock market propelled by investor exuberance was a key driver of securities fraud.233

Figure 3

234

Price to Earnings Ratio, S&P Composite Index, 1990–2000

This conclusion becomes stronger when one also considers the historical parallels between this wave of fraud and the outbreaks of massive fraud
during previous financial bubbles described in Part III.A. The second
question, whether the fraud of the late 1990s was a unique historical occurrence, must clearly be answered no. Of course, it may ultimately prove
impossible to cleanly separate the effects of deregulation, conflicts of interest and an irrational stock market and then test for the relative impact of
each on the level of securities malfeasance. Indeed, as Part IV argues, deregulation, corruption and stock market bubbles are tightly connected, with
each dynamic reinforcing the others. But the spike of restatements at the
end of the decade and the historical correlation of frauds and bubbles support a further examination of the ways in which bubbles may undermine
233
Others have offered alternative theories of causation for the rise in restatements in 1998. For
example, Moriarty and Livingston attribute the spike in restatements in 1998 to changing SEC enforcement priorities due to then SEC Chairman Levitt’s campaign against earnings management
abuses. Moriarty & Livingston, supra note 228, at 56. But the timing of the SEC’s earnings management crusade does not fully support this theory. The SEC first began its efforts to combat earnings
management in 1998, the year that Levitt gave his influential speech on the topic. Id.; see Arthur
Levitt, Chairman, SEC, The Numbers Game, Remarks at the NYU Center for Law and Business
(Sept. 28, 1998) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/
spch220.txt). Since restatements are by nature retrospective, one would expect that, if the SEC efforts
were the primary driver of restatements (and by extension the revelation of fraud) then the years affected by restatements would have dramatically increased before 1998.
234
See id. at 6. For an explanation of Shiller’s sources and methodology in making the calculations for price/earnings rations, see id. at 257 n.2. Shiller’s data on price/earnings ratio and other stock
market metrics from 1990 to 2000 is available at http://www.irrationalexuberance.com/ie_data.xls (last
visited Oct. 26, 2005).
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compliance with securities laws, even apart from deregulation.
C. How Bubbles Undermine Securities Regulations
The rising stock prices and mass psychology of bubbles cause the deterioration of compliance by securities issuers and market intermediaries
with securities laws in three ways. First, bubbles alter the rational calculus
of compliance with securities laws, such that securities issuers and market
intermediaries, such as gatekeepers, are under-deterred by antifraud rules.
Second, bubbles exacerbate the behavioral biases of issuers and intermediaries, causing them to over-discount their expected liability under the securities laws. Finally, bubbles raise the costs of compliance with securities
laws for market participants by increasing agency and information costs.
Each of these three modes is analyzed in more detail below.
1. The Rational Calculus of Securities Law Compliance
Bubbles radically change the calculus of compliance with securities laws
for issuers, their directors and officers, and market intermediaries, such as
gatekeepers. Reconsider the rough cost-benefit model for securities law
compliance outlined in Part V.A: B < > Pd *((Pe * Ll) + Lr). On one side of
the equation, bubbles cause the benefits of committing (or acquiescing in)
fraud to dramatically increase and the expected liability to dramatically decrease. With soaring stock prices come soaring benefits to those market
participants that hold stock. For company insiders the benefits are clear. But
Coffee’s misaligned incentives theory also explains how soaring benefits to
insiders translates into changed gatekeeper behavior.235 More directly, gatekeepers that own company stock or law firms with equity stakes in their clients have a clear interest in seeing that stock rise in value. In addition, all
gatekeepers indirectly benefit from stock price increases as a booming stock
market usually increases “deal flow,” which leads to more transaction-based
fees for gatekeepers.236 All of these increased benefits from higher stock
prices are enjoyed in the near term, as compared to potential liability, which,
as discussed below, is incurred further in the future.
On the other side of the equation, bubbles cause securities issuers and
market intermediaries to rationally discount their liability under securities
laws, particularly under the antifraud regime. Steadily rising stock prices
translate into a lower probability of fraud being detected or prosecuted. A
market-wide rising tide of stock prices can lift the prices of even underperforming companies and submerge all but the clearest signs of fraud in
individual companies. Moreover, rising prices eliminate the legal basis for
235

See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
See Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 711,
719 (2005).
236
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securities fraud actions. If prices rise continuously, investors would have
difficulty proving damages, let alone meeting the anterior requirements of
materiality and reliance/causation—both of which generally require a stock
price drop.237
The increased volume of securities transactions during a bubble taxes the
resources of the SEC and makes detection of fraud by government authorities less likely. Throughout the 1990s, the overall budget of the SEC and the
agency’s enforcement budget did rise; indeed it rose even more sharply in
the late 1990s as the market heated. Figure 4 shows the SEC overall budget,
and its budget for enforcement activities between 1990 and 2004.

Figure 4

238

SEC Overall and Enforcement Budgets, 1990–2004 (in millions of dollars)

237
The Supreme Court’s decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244–45 (1998), established how materiality and reliance (in this case, through the “fraud-on-the-market” theory) can be
proven as a preliminary matter through stock price declines.
238
Data on the SEC’s overall budget is taken from SEC, SEC Budget History vs. Actual Expenses, available at http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/budgetact.htm (last modified Mar. 3, 2005). Data
on the SEC’s enforcement budget is taken from the “Prevention and Suppression of Fraud” line in
the federal budget compendia for the fifteen federal fiscal years from 1990 to 2004. OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1992,
at 1177 (1991); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1993, at 1031 (1992); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1994, at 1140 (1993); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT APPENDIX, FISCAL YEAR 1995, at 961
(1994); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET APPENDIX: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1996, at 1054 (1995); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, APPENDIX:
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1997, at 1051 (1996); OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, APPENDIX: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 1998, at 1112 (1997); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, APPENDIX: BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1999, at 1134 (1998); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, APPENDIX: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2000, at 1198
(1999); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, APPENDIX: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 1203 (2000); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, APPENDIX:
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 1215 (2001); OFFICE OF
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But these increases did not keep pace with the surging stock market,
particularly with the technology-heavy NASDAQ, which skyrocketed beginning in 1997 and 1998. This increase can be seen in Figure 5, showing
the level of the NASDAQ Composite Index, and Figure 6, showing the
level of the Dow Jones Wilshire 5000, a broader market index, for the
years 1990 to 2004.

Figure 5

239

NASDAQ Composite Index, 1990–2004

Figure 6

240

Dow Jones Wilshire 5000, 1990–2004

MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, APPENDIX: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 2003, at 1178 (2002); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, APPENDIX: BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 1102 (2003); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, APPENDIX: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 1182
(2004); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, APPENDIX: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 1220–21 (2005).
239
NASDAQ Composite Index, available at http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EIXIC&a=00&
b=31&c=1990&d=11&e=31&f=2004&g=m (last visited Oct. 29, 2005).
240
Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 Composite Index, available at Bloomberg (search terms: “DJ Wil-
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Although the SEC budget increased dramatically in 2003, the increase
lagged behind both the stock market boom and its crash by several years.
This becomes apparent through two simple, novel metrics obtained by dividing both the SEC overall budget and the enforcement budget respectively, by the Dow Jones Wilshire 5000. These metrics appear in Figure 7
and Figure 8.241

Figure 7
Ratio of SEC Overall Budget to Dow Jones Wilshire Index, 1990–2004

Figure 8
Ratio of SEC Enforcement Budget to Dow Jones Wilshire Index, 1990–2004

shire 5000 TR”; range: “1/31/90” to “12/31/04”; period: monthly; market: “mid/trd”) (on file with
author).
241
For sake of simplicity, calculations were made by dividing the overall and enforcement budget
data, see SEC, SEC Budget History vs. Actual Expenses, supra note 238, by the average of the Dow
Jones Wilshire 5000, on the last day of each of the twelve months of the given year, see Dow Jones
Wilshire 5000 Composite Index, supra note 240.
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Figure 7 and Figure 8 show that the SEC overall and enforcement budgets kept pace with the stock market until 1996 or 1997. The market boom
caused a pronounced drop in the SEC’s budget relative to market growth
from 1997 through 2001. Budget increases in 2002 (combined with market
declines) only returned the indices to their levels at the beginning of the
1990s.
Understandably, during this period, SEC enforcement actions also
failed to keep pace with the booming market. Figure 9 shows the investigations, administrative proceedings, civil or injunctive actions, and litigation
actions initiated or opened in the period from 1990 to 2004.

Figure 9

242

SEC Proceedings Opened, 1990–2004

242

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1992, at 1177 (1991); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1993, at 1032 (1992); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1994, at 1141 (1993); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT APPENDIX, FISCAL YEAR
1995, at 962 (1994); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, APPENDIX: BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1996, at 1055 (1995); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
APPENDIX: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1997, at 1052 (1996); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, APPENDIX: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
FISCAL YEAR 1998, at 1112–13 (1997); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, APPENDIX: BUDGET
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1999, at 1135 (1998); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET, APPENDIX: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2000, at
1199–1200 (1999); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, APPENDIX: BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 1204–05 (2000); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, APPENDIX: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 1216–17
(2001); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, APPENDIX: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 1179–80 (2002); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, APPENDIX:
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 1103–04 (2003); OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, APPENDIX: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 2005, at 1182–83 (2004); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, APPENDIX: BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 1221–22 (2005).
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Potential bad actors in the market place would have realized that the
SEC was overtaxed and adjusted their calculations of compliance accordingly. Moreover, increased transaction volume can also create a jailbreak
effect; once a tipping point is reached, each increase in the number of
market participants engaging in fraudulent or questionable conduct makes
enforcement exponentially more difficult. Similarly, if a significant number of any given category of market participants engage in disreputable
conduct, the deterrence effect of a reputational loss drops. This dynamic
particularly affects gatekeeper behavior; gatekeepers care about their
reputation not only in an absolute sense, but also in a relative sense compared to the reputations of their competitors. In a game full of cheaters,
the marginal reputational loss from deciding to cheat is negligible.243
Even if being caught is a certainty, fraud or misconduct may still pay.
Those individuals or firms that were caught and penalized for their conduct
during the late 1990s might rationally conclude that it was worth it. The
multimillion-dollar penalties paid by stock analysts Henry Blodgett and
Jack Grubman to the SEC pale when compared to the compensation they
received both during the boom period and in golden parachutes.244 Moreover, these penalties are incurred long after the benefits to malfeasance
were realized. Thus the time value of money further weakens the deterrence value of liability.
2. Behavioral Biases and Materiality
Even if misconduct would be irrational, securities issuers and market intermediaries might still choose to engage in malfeasance because of behavioral biases exacerbated by a stock market bubble. Even financially sophisticated market players suffer from the behavioral biases that drive investor
confidence and stock market bubbles.245 For example, accountants, who
would be expected to be both adept and conservative in estimating their own
243
Evaluating the merits of this argument requires consideration of the “race to the bottom”
versus “race to the top” debate that recurs throughout corporate and securities scholarship. In other
words, would the cheating of a few gatekeepers cause other gatekeepers to cheat and the market for
gatekeepers to unwind? Or would other gatekeepers be able to compete and win market share by
distinguishing themselves from cheaters and touting their trustworthiness? For divergent views on
this question in the context of gatekeepers, see Choi, supra note 219, at 919 (proposing a selftailored liability scheme as gatekeepers choice of liability level would send a signal to market on the
gatekeeper’s reliability); Hamdani, supra note 219, at 89–90 (suggesting that market stability depends on gatekeepers’ capacity to foil unlawful conduct); Partnoy, supra note 219, at 492, 494–96
(arguing for strict liability for gatekeepers, as regulatory licenses enjoyed by gatekeepers reduce
potential reputational loss).
244
Compare SEC v. Grubman, Litigation Release No. 18,111 (Apr. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18111.htm (announcing a $15 million settlement) and SEC v.
Blodgett, Litigation Release No. 18,115 (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/lr18115.htm (announcing a $4 million settlement), with Cassidy, supra note 167 (reporting
salary and fringe benefits enjoyed by Blodgett and Grubman during the boom period). Of course, the
total liability of Blodgett and Grubman under investor litigation remains to be determined.
245
See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text.
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potential liability in securities litigation, have been shown to suffer from the
full range of behavioral biases, including overconfidence and overoptimism.246 The same behavioral story that explains how behavioral biases
among investors can create a bubble can also be used to tell how issuers and
market intermediaries can misjudge their liability in a bubble.
Because of the availability bias, gatekeepers may believe the booming
stock market will continue, and falling stock prices and shareholder suits
would therefore appear remote. Overconfidence and overoptimism lead
market participants to heavily discount the chances either that fraud can be
detected or that they will be caught in misconduct. Other biases reinforce
this thinking. The self-attribution bias, which describes how individuals
attribute successes to their own personal skill yet attribute failure to bad luck
or sabotage,247 may lead those who commit fraud to discount the possibility
of being caught. Similarly, the “hot-hand” phenomenon248 causes bad actors
to think that their string of success will continue. Hyperbolic discounting
exacerbates the under-deterrence caused by liability for fraud being incurred
after a bubble bursts, while benefits to fraud are realized immediately.249
Lastly, belief perseverance and anchoring mean that market participants are
unlikely to judge correctly when the market tide has turned, bringing with it
the increased risk of fraud being detected and punished.250
Behavioral biases have an outsized effect on securities compliance because the amorphous legal standard of materiality lies at the heart of securities law. The Supreme Court defines materiality by reference to a reasonable investor; a fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that its
disclosure “would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”251 But
this standard becomes problematic when a stock market bubble makes reasonable investors a scarce commodity. Although it is unlikely that a court
246
Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into Securities
Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 154–55 (2000).
247
Kent Daniel et al., A Theory of Overconfidence, Self-Attribution, and Security Market Underand Over-Reactions (1997), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2017 (analyzing the
extent to which self-attribution bias and other biases affect the under-reaction and over-reaction by
investors to new information).
248
Thomas Gilovich et al., The Hot Hand in Basketball: On the Misperception of Random
Sequences, 17 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 295, 296 (1985) (defining the “hot-hand” phenomenon as the
belief that a basketball player has a better “chance of hitting a basket after one or more successful shots
than after one or more misses”).
249
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
250
See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
251
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (defining materiality in context
of a fact omitted from a proxy statement); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249 (1988)
(applying the TSC Industries standard to securities fraud cases). In TSC Industries, the Court articulated the standard in a second way: to prove that a statement that was omitted from disclosure was
material requires, according to the Court, “a showing of substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberation of the reasonable shareholder.” TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449.
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would revise this objective standard during temporary periods of market
irrationality,252 these periods could distort the perception by market participants of what constitutes a reasonable investor. Their estimation of
whether an ideal, objective reasonable investor would judge any given fact
pattern to be material can become colored by the prevalence of irrationally
exuberant and euphoric investors in the market.
This misperception would be reinforced because market prices serve as
a gauge of materiality in fraud litigation.253 Courts have accepted the conclusion that the stock market is informationally efficient—i.e., stock prices
quickly reflect all new information available to the market—due to the
empirical support for the Efficient Market Hypothesis.254 This has led
many courts to use stock price movements following the public release of
information as a strong indication that that information was material.255
But when corporations and gatekeepers observe stock prices soaring due to
market euphoria, they could misjudge the materiality of information in the
erroneous belief that euphoric investors would not care and stock prices
would not plummet even if the information were disclosed.
Of course, in making materiality judgments during the drafting of disclosure or the performance of due diligence, corporations and their gatekeepers do not have the benefit of viewing market prices in hindsight after
hypothetical disclosure. They are thus forced to use rules of thumb or heuristics, and the first stage of due diligence typically involves discussions
between issuers and underwriter’s counsel on what heuristic should be used
as a proxy for materiality.256 Dollar thresholds may be debated, despite
that fact that the law does not set a numerical threshold on materiality. But
252

Indeed, an empirical study of securities fraud litigation by David Hoffman demonstrates that
courts do not factor the considerable evidence that investors exhibit behavioral biases in making investment decisions into judicial determinations of what constitutes materiality under the reasonable
investor standard. David A. Hoffman, The “Duty” to Be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV.
536, 593 (2006). Hoffman criticizes this judicial pattern as effectively imposing a duty on shareholders
to act rationally. See id. at 593–603.
253
See Basic, 485 U.S. at 247 & n.25 (citing Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1986);
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908 (9th Cir. 1975); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D.
Tex. 1980)).
254
See id. at 245–47.
255
For a seminal case, see Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 166 (2d Cir. 1980),
holding that information was not material when it was insufficient by itself to trigger a downturn in
price. For an early analysis of the impact of the Efficient Market Hypothesis on determinations of
materiality, see generally Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A
Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373 (1984).
256
For a practical, general overview of the due diligence process written for those lawyers most
likely to be conducting diligence, see generally Mark Schonberger & Vasiliki B. Tsaganos, Top Twelve
Most Frequently Asked Questions by Junior Associates Conducting Due Diligence, in CONDUCTING
DUE DILIGENCE 9–70 (Practicing Law Institute 2004). For practical surveys of due diligence in securities offerings written from the perspective of underwriters’ counsel, see Craig E. Chapman, Underwriters’ Due Diligence Revisited, in CONDUCTING DUE DILIGENCE, supra, at 71–92; Valerie Ford Jacob,
The Due Diligence Process from the Underwriter’s Perspective, in CONDUCTING DUE DILIGENCE,
supra, at 93–128.
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setting these thresholds based on a company’s stock prices would be a
grave legal and logical error, particularly if the stock price is already inflated, either by frenzied speculation or fraud.257 Even thresholds based on
a company’s earnings or asset values can be skewed by the speculation of a
bubble or fraud. Again, behavioral biases shape all of these determinations, with the end result that materiality determinations are made through
the filters of heuristics layered on heuristics.
3. Rising Information and Agency Costs
Even those issuers and market intermediaries that seek to comply with
the law find compliance frustrated by two types of costs that rise with the
inflation of a bubble. First, the increased transaction flow during a market
boom translates into increased information processing costs.258 These costs
affect both the internal compliance function of securities issuers and, particularly, external gatekeepers.259 Overworked gatekeepers can miss signs of
misconduct.260 The rapid growth of an issuer means that resolving accounting issues and establishing internal quality controls at that company becomes
exponentially more difficult. Increased work and the accompanying pressure
to close deals and satisfy clients can lead to an industry-wide decline in the
professional norms critical to gatekeeping.261
Moreover, a bubble creates an inflation of agency costs. Increased
workload strains quality control at issuers and gatekeeper organizations
alike. Institutional controls and memory suffer as a booming economy creates alternative job opportunities and increases staff turnover. With shorter
careers at firms, individuals become less invested in the long-term future of
the firm and discount legal liability that the firm is not expected to realize for
several years.262 Individuals may chose to commit (or acquiesce to) malfeasance or shirk monitoring duties because, by the time that the costs of such
257
For a discussion of the problematic gap between the qualitative legal standard for materiality
and the quantitative standards of materiality employed by the accounting profession, see Manning
Gilbert Warren III, Revenue Recognition and Corporate Counsel, 56 SMU L. REV. 885, 898–906
(2003).
258
Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 419 (2003).
259
See id. at 446 n.133.
260
See id. at 440–41 (explaining that “people can only process a finite amount of information during any particular period of time . . . . [T]he decision maker’s decision quality decreases if she is given
additional information.”).
261
John Coates provides one example of professional norms declining during a boom, in the
widespread failure of law firms to build standard anti-takeover defenses into the organizational documents of many of the new companies they advised during the late 1990s. See John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1303, 1309
(2001).
262
See James A. Fanto, Subtle Hazards Revisited: The Corruption of a Financial Holding Company by a Corporate Client’s Inner Circle, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 7, 28 (2004) (“[I]nvestment bankers are
today little more than hired guns with weak commitments to their current employer investment bank
and more loyalty to their corporate clients, whom they often bring along to any new employer”).
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actions are realized, the individual will likely be employed elsewhere.263
High staff turnover makes it difficult to trace responsibility for misconduct
back to specific individuals. When potential misconduct is identified, the
individuals that stay with firms tend to blame those employees that conveniently left the firm.264 With a tighter labor market and competition for
“stars,” firms become more reluctant to discipline employees.265
VI. TOWARDS A MORE ROBUST SECURITIES LAW
REGIME: A RESEARCH AGENDA
Part V argues that the compliance with securities laws deteriorates during the rise of a bubble as antifraud rules lose much of their deterrence
effect during bubble times. This fluctuation in the effectiveness of securities laws is compounded by tendency of bubbles to coincide with and spur
cycles of deregulation, as described in Parts III and IV; during the rise of a
bubble securities regulations appear less essential and are rolled back, watered down or under-enforced due to powerful currents in the political
marketplace. But when the bubble bursts, the political tide shifts and the
regulatory carousel spins, bringing new regulations only after much of the
damage to investors and to investor confidence in the integrity of the market has already been inflicted. Many policymakers and scholars also argue
that much of the regulation after the bubble threatens to chill an already
dampened climate for capital formation.266
In this light, the regulations of the Sarbanes-Oxley era have little prospect of addressing the next epidemic of securities fraud. First, these regulations are likely to be diluted by lawmakers and regulators as political pressure builds; as noted above, the first signs of the political/regulatory cycle
shifting direction have appeared.267 Second, the deterrent effect of these
regulations will be undercut by the dynamics of the next bubble as compliance deteriorates.
One response is to accept as inevitable fluctuations in effectiveness and
periodic decay of securities regulation. But accepting these fluctuations
means accepting the possibility of systematic under-deterrence and potential over-deterrence of securities issuers and market intermediaries. This
263

Id.
For an analysis of excuses and the assignment of blame in organizations from the perspective
of social psychology and organizational behavior, see Raymond L. Higgins & C.R. Snyder, The Business of Excuses, in IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT IN THE ORGANIZATION 73, 78 (Robert A. Giacolone &
Paul Rosenfeld eds., 1989) (noting that the most successful blaming strategy is to direct blame outside
the organization); Nancy Bell & Phillip Tetlock, The Intuitive Politician and the Assignment of Blame
in Organizations, in IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT IN THE ORGANIZATION, supra, at 105, 110.
265
See Coffee, supra note 143, at 1412–13 (discussing the celebrity status of high-profile securities analysts during the 1990s boom).
266
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
267
See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text.
264
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suboptimal result not only offends economic sensibility, it creates the potential for epidemics of fraud. Of course, one could view the bursting of
the bubble as a needed tonic for the market, disciplining rash or naïve investors, including those who should have recognized the risk of being defrauded. But a glance at the history of the bubbles in Part III, from the
South Seas to the 1929 stock market, reveals the enormous potential cost of
resorting to this disciplinary measure. Epidemics of securities fraud carry
with them the potential for a cataclysmic free fall of investor confidence in
the integrity of capital markets.268
The alternative is to design a securities law regime that adapts to and
addresses the decaying effects that bubbles have on deterrence and yet
resists the undertow of deregulation during the rise of a bubble. This Part
sets out a research agenda for further study into the interaction of stock
market bubbles and legal rules that would aid in design of such a regime.
It bears noting two things that this Article does not attempt to do.
First, this Article does not propose laws or regulations that would aim to
prevent bubbles.269 History and economic research have shown bubbles
are a remarkably robust phenomena;270 the human folly behind these
speculative frenzies is not to be legislated away. Second, this Article
does not address another regulatory approach to bubbles, namely to accept their inevitability but ensure that the national financial system is
sound enough to withstand a crisis of investor confidence and a potential
liquidity crunch brought on by the collapse of a bubble. This approach
has been the subject of much innovative economic and legal scholarship
of late that has looked at, for example, banking regulations,271 international policies to thwart financial contagion among countries,272 the risk
268

See Frankel, supra note 178, at 443–44; Stout, supra note 158, at 433–35.
For a sample of proposals in the legal literature to counteract the development of bubbles,
see Theresa A. Gabaldon, John Law, with a Tulip, in the South Seas: Gambling and the Regulation
of Euphoric Market Transactions, 26 J. CORP. L. 225, 277–84 (2001) [hereinafter Gabaldon, John
Law] (suggesting the implementation of regulations analogous to controls on gambling); Partnoy,
supra note 14, at 783–84 (suggesting a lender of last resort remedy to control the flow of capital to
prevent crashes); Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Role of Law in Managing Market Moods: The Whole
Story of Jason, Who Bought High, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 111, 125–27 (2000) (book review) [hereinafter Gabaldon, The Role of Law] (proposing changes to margin requirements, use of “circuit
breakers,” and relaxing restrictions on short-selling, among other policies to combat speculation
during a bubble).
270
See generally KINDLEBERGER, supra note 49 (surveying history of bubbles and unsuccessful
policies to avert them). For economic literature on the robustness of bubbles in experimental markets,
see supra note 43.
271
See, e.g., Jeffrey Carmichael & Neil Esho, Asset Price Bubbles and Prudential Regulation, in
ASSET PRICE BUBBLES, supra note 13, at 481 (suggesting that the banking system can be influenced by
using adjustments in provisioning requirements to control bubbles).
272
See, e.g., Michael D. Bordo & Antu Panini Murshid, Globalization and Changing Patterns in
Crisis Transmission, in ASSET PRICE BUBBLES, supra note 13, at 309 (suggesting that recent financial
shocks are transmitted between advanced countries but no longer flow to emerging countries as they
did in the past and that crises in emerging countries are regional due to the weakness in the banking and
financial structure).
269
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posed by new financial entities, such as hedge funds,273 and hybrid financial products, including various forms of derivatives,274 to economic stability. Some of this scholarship has even addressed the fact that certain
regulations, such as prudential banking regulations, tend to be procyclical
(that is, they exacerbate business cycles or the negative effect of business
cycles rather than counter them) and investigated novel reforms to address this problem.275 These topics deserve law review articles all their
own.
Instead, the research agenda below is structured to think about ways to
reinforce the deterrence effect of securities laws during the rise of bubbles.
One could imagine market rules that would address the problems outlined
in Part V.C by changing or being triggered by the market conditions that
undermine the effectiveness of traditional securities deterrence. In a most
radical (and therefore more unlikely) conception, these rules would function as a sort of regulatory Keynesianism; the inflation of a bubble or the
superheating of capital markets would trigger regulations designed to reinforce the deterrence effect of securities laws. Then, when the market
crashes or subsides, the regulatory provisions would retract to prevent the
danger of chilling business activity and capital formation.
A comprehensive discussion of what these adaptive regulations would
look like is beyond the scope of this Article, but the deterrence model outlined in Part V.A suggests the basic options available. Regulators could
reinforce the deterrence value of securities law during bubble periods by
increasing the probabilities of enforcement or detection (for example, by
increasing the budget of enforcement agencies), or increasing the legal
liability of issuers and market intermediaries, either by increasing damages,276 by imposing new duties or standards of care on these actors, or by
narrowing safe harbors.
But a full discussion of these options is premature. Five critical sets of
questions must be answered before a more robust securities law regime can
be designed. Together, these questions form a template for further research.
273
See, e.g., Hu, supra note 22, at 868–75 (discussing the bail-out of the Long Term Capital Management hedge fund).
274
See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J.
CORP. L. 211, 216 (1997) (suggesting that the use of derivatives to avoid regulations that seek to ameliorate market failure may create unanticipated and serious regulatory distortion and deadweight
losses).
275
See Carmichael & Esho, supra note 271, at 495–97 (analyzing how typical loan loss provisioning requirements in bank regulations can accentuate a boom and bust cycle and describing novel dynamic provisioning policies by Spanish bank regulators that are counter-cyclical).
276
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel argued in an influential 1985 article that the current law
limiting recoveries in private securities litigation to actual damages may lead to under-deterrence of issuers
and market intermediaries. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities
Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 615–18 (1985). But punitive damages remain unavailable under federal
securities laws. E.g., Byrnes v. Faulkner, Dawkins & Sullivan, 550 F.2d 1303, 1313 (2d Cir. 1977).
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A. Question 1: When Does Securities Regulation Require Reinforcement?
To design adaptive securities regulations that buttress the deterrence
regime, it is necessary to learn when market conditions begin to undermine
securities regulations. What would be the trigger for adaptive regulations?
This question could be rephrased as, “When does a bubble begin?”
But this question elicits hot debate among economists, who disagree on
what constitutes a bubble.277 Economists have argued over whether many
of the episodes widely considered to be bubbles—including the 1929 stock
market and the 1990s technology stock boom—were in fact bubbles.278
More significantly, many scholars are less than sanguine on the question of
whether bubbles can ever be identified ex ante or in media res.279
All of these questions, particularly the last one, stem from the fact that
most economists have defined bubbles as divergences from the fundamental value of stocks. But measuring the fundamental value of stocks, as
noted above in Part II, remains an elusive goal. Under the principal definition, specifying the fundamental value of a stock requires knowing its future income streams.280 Some economists have noted certain indicia that
the capital markets are diverging from fundamental values,281 but whether
these indicia are dispositive or merely probative is a disputed academic
matter, and systematic research into whether these indicia can be used to
test for a bubble ex ante or in media res remains to be done.
But it may not be necessary to ask the question in this manner, i.e.,
whether a bubble has begun in the strictest economic sense. The common
thread of Part V is that extended booms in stock markets blunt the deterrence of securities law because of the mass perception of market participants that the market will continue to rise. This blunting effect thus occurs
regardless of whether a bubble has formed in a strict economic sense, i.e.,
whether stock prices have diverged from a “fundamental” value. Therefore, a more refined question of when deterrence requires reinforcement
277
Compare Meltzer, supra note 39, at 31 (arguing that “[b]ubble explanations do not offer a consistent explanation of buyers and sellers”), with SHILLER, supra note 12, at 171–90 (arguing that economic data shows clear irrationalities and mispricings in capital markets that reflect existence of stock
market bubbles).
278
See, e.g., GARBER, supra note 80 (arguing that economic data suggest that the tulipomania, the
Mississippi Bubble and the South Sea Bubble are not inconsistent with rational explanations or fundamental values of the assets involved); McGrattan & Prescott, supra note 23, at 273 (arguing that the
stock market was undervalued in 1929); Lubos Pástor & Pietro Veronesi, Was There a Nasdaq Bubble
in the Late 1990s? (Univ. of Chicago Ctr. for Research in Sec. Prices, Working Paper No. 557, 2004),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 557061 (arguing that bubbles may not
have existed in the 1920s and 1990s).
279
See, e.g., Randall S. Kroszner, Asset Price Bubbles, Information and Public Policy, in ASSET
PRICE BUBBLES, supra note 13, at 3, 4–7 (characterizing the practice as “quite difficult” and questioning whether policy discussions should take asset price bubbles into account).
280
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
281
See supra note 42 (discussing market anomalies).
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would focus on when investors or market participants believe that the market will continue to rise and whether they believe other investors are acting
irrationally. If these beliefs are prevalent, many of the negative effects on
securities law compliance described in Part V.C will occur.
Robert Shiller has already outlined a promising approach of employing
surveys to construct investor confidence indexes that could help answer
these questions.282 Another line of inquiry would be to investigate whether
proxies exist that can measure the mass entry of noise traders into the market. If the behavioral finance model described in Part II is correct, noise
trading by unsophisticated investors that engage in “herding” drives bubbles.283 One could posit that measuring influxes of first-time or otherwise
unsophisticated investors into the capital markets might create an early
warning system for regulators. In any event, further economic research is
needed to identify which groups of investors engage in noise trading. A
demographic profile of noise traders or a list of other identifying characteristics would prove most useful for policymakers.
B. Question 2: How Can the Political Disincentives to Regulation During
a Bubble be Overcome?
Even if the appropriate conditions for implementing flexible regulations can be identified, as Part IV argues, there will be a powerful political
current resisting regulations. One approach could be to have automatic
regulations that are hardwired into statute or regulation to take effect when
certain conditions are met. But this would require a level of drafting precision that the uncertainties and disputes mentioned above generally render
impossible at the current time.
There is one proposal that could serve as an exception to this general
rule. If deterrence is at least partially compromised by the SEC’s enforcement capabilities being overwhelmed during a boom market (whether bubble or not),284 one solution would be to tie the SEC’s enforcement budget
into market capitalization.285 Of course, unless emergency appropriations
are involved, there will always be a lag between a market upswing and the
SEC receiving additional funds, but the lag need not be as great as that
during the last decade.286
The alternative to automatic regulations is to leave the decision to im282
Robert J. Shiller, Measuring Bubble Expectations and Investor Confidence (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7008, 1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=154741.
283
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
284
See supra notes 238–243 and accompanying text.
285
I am indebted to Lynn Stout for suggesting this idea.
286
One alternative would be to fund the SEC enforcement budget through user fees, such as the
fees on registration statements that help fund the SEC’s corporate finance activities. But this option
would also threaten to compromise the objectivity of the SEC’s enforcement functions.
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plement adaptive securities regulations in the discretion of regulators who
are more insulated from the political pressure to deregulate. But are any
regulators sufficiently insulated? This leads to the next research question.
C. Question 3: Which Regulators Should be Involved in Determining
when Adaptive Regulations Should take Effect?
This question requires not only consideration of the relative political
insulation enjoyed by different regulators, but an analysis of the comparative competencies of regulators in analyzing the types of economic data
that would signal whether investor exuberance has reached the critical
level. The ideological temperament of agencies is also crucial. An agency
like the Federal Reserve may be relatively insulated from political pressure
and possess unparalleled economic expertise, but its policymakers and
economists remain among the most skeptical that bubbles exist, either in
particular cases, or at all.287
Comparative law scholarship into how regulators in other countries
have succeeded or failed to address bubbles offers a fruitful avenue for
resolving the second and third questions.288
D. Question 4: How Can Adaptive Regulations be Sufficiently Calibrated
to Reinforce Deterrence?
Reinforcing the deterrence effect of antifraud rules requires understanding the extent to which that effect is being undermined by the dynamics of a bubble. If additional deterrence is too weak, the value of adaptive
regulations do not justify their complexity. On the other hand, too much
additional deterrence can chill capital formation and force issuers and market intermediaries to abandon the capital markets.289 Calibration requires a
better sense of the extent that bubble dynamics undermine the rational calculus of compliance. Moreover, further research is needed to determine
which behavioral biases affect issuers and market intermediaries and to
measure the extent of their effect.290
287
See WESTERN, supra note 135, at 159–60 (discussing Alan Greenspan’s resistance to classifying the stock market boom of the 1990s as a bubble).
288
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 142 (discussing the failure of the Japanese central bank to address
the bubble of the 1980s).
289
Howell Jackson has explored this problem of calibration in the context of additional liability
that was imposed on lawyers advising thrifts after the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. See Howell
E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers to Improve the Regulation of Financial
Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1049–56 (1993).
290
Some economists have noted that behavioral finance offers a long list of possible behavioral
biases, but have not specified which biases affect bubbles and to what extent. See, e.g., Robert S.
Chirinko, Comments on: “Stocks as Money . . .” and “Bubble Psychology”, in ASSET PRICE BUBBLES,
supra note 13, at 231, 234–45 (advocating further research to measure the effects of investors’ behavioral biases on the rise and fall of stock prices). See generally Prentice, supra note 246 (surveying the
research into behavioral biases affecting accountants).
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E. Question 5: What Legal Precedents Could be Used for Adaptive
Regulations?
Adaptive securities regulations face not only practical, but also legal
challenges in that laws designed to fluctuate according to market conditions are somewhat alien to legal thought. Emergency regimes are rare in
law because of deep rule of law concerns and because they may violate
settled expectations.291 The legal scholarship on emergency rules has
flourished in the context of constitutional law and government responses
to terrorism.292 The jurisprudential debate on emergency constitutional
rules could be used as a prompt for scholarship on emergency regimes in
economic law.
Precedents do exist for emergency SEC regulations. The SEC was
given the authority in the wake of the 1987 market crash to enact regulations that, during periods of “extraordinary market volatility,” would restrict trading practices that contribute to market volatility.293 Furthermore, after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the SEC, pursuant to its
authority under Section 12(k)(2) of the Exchange Act,294 issued a number
of emergency orders to stabilize the financial markets.295 But, these provisions alone would not give the SEC authority to pass temporary rules
during the extended period of a stock market bubble.296
New statutory authority would need to be given and an administrative
291
See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1043–44 (2004) (noting that a temporary emergency state is a “desperate expedient,” but conceding that it may be preferable
to a “normalization of emergency conditions”).
292
See generally Ackerman, supra note 291 (advocating new constitutional concepts in order to
preserve civil liberties in the current crisis); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating
Emergencies (U. of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 48, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract_id=441343 (finding the “accommodation” view of the Constitution more persuasive than the
“strict” view during national emergencies).
293
Market Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-432, sec. 6(a), § 9(h)(2), 104 Stat. 963, 975
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78i(h)(2) (2000)).
294
15 U.S.C. § 78l(k)(2) (2000). This section gives the SEC broad authority to pass emergency
rules. Under this section, the SEC may pass orders
to alter, supplement, suspend, or impose requirements or restrictions with respect to any matter or
action subject to regulation by the Commission or a self-regulatory organization under the securities laws, as the Commission determines is necessary in the public interest and for the protection
of investors . . . to maintain or restore fair and orderly securities markets.
§ 78l(k)(2)(A).
295
See, e.g., Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(k)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,493 (Sept. 20, 2001) (providing that the American Stock Exchange would shift
part of its operations to the floor of the New York Stock Exchange after its own building was damaged
in the terrorist attacks).
296
See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(k)(2)(B) (providing that rules promulgated pursuant to section 12(k)(2)
can last no longer than ten business days). But a stock market bubble is not included in the Act’s
definition of “emergency.” See § 78l(k)(7)(A) (“‘[E]mergency’ means . . . a major market disturbance characterized by or constituting . . . sudden and excessive fluctuations of securities prices
generally, or a substantial threat thereof, that threaten fair and orderly markets . . . .”). Similarly, it
would be hard to shoehorn an extended stock market bubble into the “period[] of extraordinary
market volatility” required by section 9(h)(2) of the Exchange Act. § 78i(h)(2).

448

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:393

law mechanism for implementing adaptive securities regulations would
be required. But the form of this mechanism raises provocative administrative law questions. If regulations would vary over time at an agency’s
discretion, would formal or informal rule making procedures be required?
How would due process concerns be addressed? Of course, the more
procedural requirements that are required for the enactment of adaptive
regulations, the more pressure points exist for the political resistance to
regulation described in Part IV.B.
This Article does not intend to suggest that these practical and legal
problems are easily overcome or insurmountable, but modestly hopes to
set out a research agenda and provoke further inquiry.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to identify a recurrent and grave problem
with securities law that has not been thoroughly explored before, namely
the periodic decay of securities law brought on by the inflation of a stock
market bubble. A bubble—by spurring or reinforcing political pressures
to deregulate financial markets and by causing the deterioration of securities law compliance—makes capital markets vulnerable to epidemics of
widespread securities fraud.
There is a danger in the current legal scholarship of focusing on the
trees—specific provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley—and missing the historical
forest, which is populated by the failures of law to address bubbles and
epidemics of fraud. The principal flaw in Sarbanes-Oxley is not in any of
its provisions, but in that it represents just another episode of new securities laws designed to re-fight the last war by seeking to prevent the
unique schemes just committed.
Sarbanes-Oxley is likely to be revisited and revised; if not now, then
when memories of Enron and other recent scandals recede even further.
The political market will inevitably shift and lay the groundwork for future deregulation of the financial markets. And securities law, which has
grown so much in the last five years, will again decay with the next stock
market bubble.
A failure to confront the periodic growth and decay of securities law
leaves capital markets vulnerable to the next epidemic of fraud. U.S.
markets may not be as fortunate with Enron’s successors; the next epidemic of fraud and the next stock market bubble collapse may trigger a
cataclysmic blow to investor confidence and investor trust in the integrity
of the capital markets.
This Article proposes a research agenda that would shed further light
on how stock market bubbles cause the decay of securities law and would
provide policy building blocks for a more robust securities law regime.
Without further inquiry into and dialogue on this decay, we may be con-
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demned, like T.S. Eliot’s Phoenician, to reenter the whirlpool and, with
time picking at the collective memories of bubble and fraud in whispers,
to forget alternately the profit, and then the loss.
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Appendix
Country
and Assets
Affected

Prevalence
of Fraud During
Rise of Bubble

1690s

England,
stocks

Widespread.

1719

1720

Time
Period

Legal and Political Actions Legal and Political
Before or During Bubble
Response to the Crash
Royal charters granted towards numerous speculative
or fraudulent ventures.
Promoters give government
figures stock to buy support
for ventures. Parliamentary
bills to regulate capital markets fail.

England’s first securities laws, including
limits on number of
brokers in London.
Laws wane over two
subsequent decades.297

France, shares Uncertain.
in the Missis- The bubble resemsippi Combled a Ponzi scheme.
pany

Mississippi Company assumes national debt and
exclusive right to French
trade with Louisiana. Promoter of bubble given right
to collect taxes and print
money to support scheme.

Exile of promoter,
execution of several
confederates, and
French financial reform
stalled until 1787.298

England,
shares in the
South Sea
Company and
other ventures

South Sea Company and the
privatization and securitization of national debt authorized by separate acts of
Parliament.

The Bubble Act endures
for a century.

Widespread among
schemes launched in
response to South
Sea success. Massive insider trading
in South Sea shares.

Government resisted measures to control conversion of
national debt into shares of
South Sea Company, as
prominent ministers and
courtiers secretly given
Company stock by insiders.

Sir John Barnard’s Act.
Unprecedented prosecutions.299

The Bubble Act is passed to
eliminate competition for
South Sea Company.

Table A-1. Historical Bubbles: Episodes of Fraud During the Rise of Bubbles; Legal and
Political Context.

297

See supra Part III.A.1.
See generally GARBER, supra note 80, at 91–93; MACKAY, supra note 80, at 1–51. It must be
noted, however, that John Law, the promoter of the Mississippi Bubble, appears to have believed that
the scheme would have enriched everyone who participated. See MACKAY, supra note 80, at 43 (explaining that Law “had never doubted of the final success of his projects” in making France wealthy).
The element of fraudulent intent may be missing in this historical episode.
299
See supra Part III.A.2. For the reasons that the Bubble Act can be considered both an example
of political support for a bubble and a political reaction to a bubble, see supra note 92.
298
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1820s

1845–
1846
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Country
and Assets
Affected

Prevalence
of Fraud During
Rise of Bubble

Britain, stock
in new companies, particularly
South American ventures
and South
American
sovereign
debt

False prospectuses
widespread.

Britain, railroad stocks

Companies sell more Parliamentary bills authorize
shares than author- dozens of competing railway
ized.
lines. Prime Minister dilutes
regulations that would have
Company insiders
curbed new railway develsell forged shares.
opment to avert a glut.
Accounting fraud

Use of offshore
contracts to evade
British usury laws.
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Legal and Political Actions Legal and Political
Before or During Bubble
Response to the Crash
Repeal of the Bubble Act.

Reforms of regulations
Wave of parliamentary char- governing300Bank of
ters granted to English com- England.
panies.

Members of Parliament act as
Corporate payments directors of companies investing in South America.
to journalists to
promote securities. Cabinet refuses to intervene
in bubble.
“Ponzi finance”:
payment of foreign
loans out of capital
instead of out of
earnings.
Suspension of the Bank
Act.
Laws prohibiting dividends being paid out of
capital and imposing
accounting reforms.301

and insider trading.
1869

United States, Widespread market
stocks
manipulation.
Jay Gould attempts
to corner market.

Acquiescence or participation Congressional investigation into Gould.
by lawmakers.
Gould attempts to use inside
information from Grant
administration.

Supreme Court broadens economic powers of
federal government in
Knox v. Lee.302

Table A-1 (continued). Historical Bubbles: Episodes of Fraud During the Rise of Bubbles;
Legal and Political Context.

300
See Repeal of Bubble Act, 1825, 6 Geo. 4, c. 91; CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 100–09; H.M.
HYNDMAN, COMMERCIAL CRISES OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 28–37 (2d ed. 1902).
301
Joint Stock Bank Act, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 113 (prohibiting the Bank of England from increasing its issuance of notes above a set limit, in an effort to prevent inflation); see also CHANCELLOR,
supra note 8, at 125–33, 145–46 (discussing the role of individuals and Parliament in the railway mania
of the 1840s); HYNDMAN, supra note 300, at 59 (noting the “worthlessness” of the Bank Act of 1844
during the railway crash). Chancellor notes that many members of Parliament are thought to have sold
their votes to the railway companies. See CHANCELLOR, supra note 8, at 133 (“One railway company
boasted of commanding a hundred votes in the Commons, and members of Parliament were said to go
from one railway office to another hawking their votes in support of fresh railway bills.”). This corruption extended to members of the Board of Ordinance, the body responsible for inspecting new railway
proposals. See id. at 139; SHLEIFER, supra note 12, at 170 (noting the introduction of dividend restrictions and accounting reforms). For a comprehensive history of the role of English law and lawyers in
promoting this railway boom and the effects of the railway expansion on English law, see RANDE W.
KOSTAL, LAW AND ENGLISH RAILWAY CAPITALISM 1825–1875 (1994).
302
See supra notes 103–106, 112, 117–119 and accompanying text.
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Period
1873

Country
and Assets
Affected

Prevalence
of Fraud During
Rise of Bubble

Legal and Political Actions
Before or During Bubble

United States, Crédit Mobilier and Federal land grants to railrailroad
Pacific Mail Steam- roads, many of which obstocks
ship scandals.
tained through bribes.
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Legal and Political
Response to the Crash
Sea change in American
politics as monetary and
class issue take precedence.
Democrats gain in 1874
Congressional elections.
1875 Resumption of
Specie Act.
Julliard v. Greenman.303

1880s

1920s

Britain, investment
company
stocks and
loans to South
America

Alleged fraud by
Argentine government.

Active involvement of Argentine and other South American governments in soliciting,
Collusion between structuring and guaranteeing
investment company investments in infrastructure.
officers and South
Alleged fraud by Argentine
American governgovernment.
ments.

“The business of America is
United States, Widespread fraud
stocks
and market manipu- business.”
lation.
End of the Progressive era of
regulation.

Bank of England leads
bail out of Baring
Brothers.
Coup d’etat in Argentina followed by laws
restricting foreign investment.304
New Deal.
Passage of major securities laws including,
•

Securities Act of
1933;

•

Securities Exchange
Act of 1934;

•

Public Utilities
Holding Company
Act;

•

Glass-Steagall Act305

Lax antitrust enforcement.

1960s

United States,
“growth
stocks” and
“new-issues,”
stocks of
conglomerates, “concept
stocks”

Deceptive and
fraudulent accounting practices.
Insider trading and
market manipulation
by brokers and
underwriters. Scandals at AMEX.

Lax enforcement of securities 1968 FTC investigation
and antitrust laws.
of conglomerates.
Williams Act.
SEC attacks deceptive
accounting practices.
New broker-dealer
regulations.
SEC investigation of
AMEX.
SEC fraud investigations
of securities issuers.306

Table A-1 (continued). Historical Bubbles: Episodes of Fraud During the Rise of Bubbles;
Legal and Political Context.

303

See supra notes 107–111, 113–119 and accompanying text.
See HYNDMAN, supra note 300, at 153–58; SHLEIFER, supra note 12, at 171.
305
See supra Part III.A.4.
306
See supra Part III.A.5.
304
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Late
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Country
and Assets
Affected

Prevalence
of Fraud During
Rise of Bubble

United States, Major securities
technology
fraud scandals,
stocks
including Enron,
WorldCom.
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Legal and Political Actions Legal and Political
Before or During Bubble
Response to the Crash
Securities laws lowering
liability:

Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
SEC regulations.

•

Private Securities Litiga- Enforcement actions
tion Reform Act of 1995; and settlements.

•

Securities Litigation and New York State AttorUniform Standards Act of ney General investigates
securities practices.
1998.

Supreme Court cases lowering securities law liability or
restricting scope of securities
laws:
•

Lampf, Pleva;

•

Central Bank of Denver.

Prosecution of officers
of prominent companies.
Wave of private securities litigation with
record verdicts and
settlements.

Development of other judicial
Backlash against reguladoctrines raising bar for
tion begins several years
securities litigation claims.
later.307
Repeal of Glass-Steagall Act.
Resistance to proposed SEC
reforms, particularly by
accounting industry.

Table A-1 (continued). Historical Bubbles: Episodes of Fraud During the Rise of Bubbles;
Legal and Political Context.

307

See supra Part III.B.

